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EBBI l: INTRODUCTION 
0 .1 Format of the QaQer 
This paper attempts firstly to examine the current state of 
Zealand abortion law and then to determine what, if any, effect 
the proposed Bill of Rights would have upon it. The approach 
taken is to look at the law through the eyes of the three central 
characters affected b y the abortion decision: The pregnant woman; 
the father of the unborn child; and the unborn child himself. 
The paper- begins with a description and criticism Di case-law 
doctr-ines on legal personhood and the supposed 1 i ve-bi ,~th re-
quirement for legal personhood. Next, Article 14 of the proposed 
Bi 11 of , is subjected to syntactical scrutiny to determine whet-
her it applies to the unborn child. That necessitates the analy-
sis of recent case-law on abortion appearing Chapter 3. 
The concE::>pt of "viability" as it appe2,rs in P,merican 
Zealand abortion legislation is the subject of Chapter 
includes also a discussion on the possible impact of 
E'ctogeneti c technology on the abortion 
countries. 
and Nev-J 
4, 
de\/el op1 ng 
those tv-JO 
The existing New Zealand abortion scheme is next compared 
the requirements of Article 14 in Chapter 5. These requirements 
a.re divided into two components the procedural and the 
substanti \te 1 aw aS:-pect s . Chapter 5 takes each of these aspects 
and analy::-:e"', their adequacy in light of Article 
- - ' 
( i ) 
separate viewpoints of th e pregnant woman, the father of t he 
unborn c h ild, and the unborn child itself . Included also in that 
Chapter is an exposition of the doctrine developing in tort law . 
Article 21 of the Draft Bi l l of Rights is the focus of the 
chapters of this paper. the separate viewpoints of 
1 ast 
the 
p1' egr1ant v-1oman, the father of the unborn chi l d, and the unbor-n 
child itself are adopted in examining the likely effects of this 
provision on the current New Zealand abortion law. 
The· ff1Et in theme~,. of together- in the 
conclusion. 
0.2 ~QffiffiQD!Y Used Ter ms 
It is useful at this stage to jntroduce some of the terms common-
] ',. us E:· d i n con n e c t i o r1 t·J i t h p r- e -n at al l i f e . This can best be done 
by simple description of the processes of ovulation, fert-
ilization and implantation. 
Tr,e ovary is the female gonad, the organ which producE•s the 
female sex cells or ova and hormones, including female hormones 
(estrogens). 
ovum is the female reproductive cell or "egg" VJh i eh is 
produced in the ovaries. 
The ovaries of the woman contain follicles in which ova are held. 
( i i ) 
Approximately o nce a mont h an ovum is r eleased in a 
pr o cess 
called ovulation . On i ts r elease fr o m the follicle , t
h e ov um 
the Fallopian Tube which links the ovary to the 
uterus. 
For fertilization to occur the ovum must u nite with t
he male 
sperm within 48 hours of release . When the ovum is rele
ased, i t 
by a shiny skin called the zona pellucida . To 
fertilise the ovum it 1s necessary for the sperm to pen
etrate 
this skin and thjs it does within the Fallopian Tube. 
The product of this conception 1s now called a zygote . It 
tra.-
vels down the Fallopian lube within which it is held for thr
ee to 
five days by a valve at the junction of the tube and the en
trance 
to the ute,~us. It 1s held for this long to allow the n
ecessary 
cell divisions to occur, and for the zona pellucida 
to be shed. 
Without this shedding of the zona pellucida~ the zygote is u
nable 
to implant itself in the lining of the uterus. 
The fertilised ovum, on entering the uterus. may implan
t itself 
in the uterine wall. There are substantial losses of zy
gotes 
which are flushed from the uterus before implantation. 
F'roba.bl y 
betv-Jeen 15 and • .::, 1 •• .1 percent of all zygotes do not 
survive 
i mpl antati on, and even after implantation, a further 20 t
o 
percent will not survive, or will be stillborn or spontaneou
sly 
aborted. 
The zygote which does implant in the lining of the uterus, p
asses 
( i i i ) 
through a nu mber of phases in the implantation p rocess. At fi r s
t 
it is ca l led a blastula which penetrates th e muco
us me mbrane 
lining the uterus and attaches itself to the uterine wal
l by a 
network of roots. The implantation of the blastula in the uter
-
jne wall takes place about five to seven days after fertilisation 
o·f the ovum, and itself takes about four d ays . Implantat i on i
s 
complete by the eleventh day followi n g upon fertilisation . 
From two weeks after conception until approximately eight 
development the unborn child is medically termed an embryo . 
the eighi:.h week of development Llntil birth, the medical 
applied is fetus . 
i-JeE•ks 
From 
term 
The term unborn child is used by some people to cover the whole 
of the pregnc;1.ncy, though often only from the time of implantation 
to birth., and not from conceQtion to birth. The term unbor
n 
eh j 1 d is used in this paper to describe the full stage of humar, 
deveJ opme::•r,t from fertilisation until birth. It includes also 
those ovum artificially fertili~ed in-vitro. 
Ho\,~e\/er as most abortion operations are performed upon fetusE·s, 
and some upon embryos, the discussion in the paper is relevant 
mainly at that stage of human development. 
It is not intended to discuss the difficulties surrounding the 
related area of fetal experimentation . 
( l \/) 
0.3 Conceets of Human Life 
importan t t h eme underly i ng the whole abortion prob l em i s 
the question of when human li fe begins . From a biological 
po in t 
of view there is no argument as to when life begins . Th
at point 
is conception. The rea l problem which has arisen is 
as t o t h e 
value of that life, especially at its earliest stages. 
The New Zealand Royal Commission on Contraception Ste
,,-i 1 i sati on 
·1077 .. , , , ' found i 4- useful to classify the wide range of 
v i e w~ put to jt a c cording to three broad classifications. 
It is 
USE'ful t o adopt these here and simply to use the Commissio
n ' s 
( i ) 
de s c ription of the three schools of thought. 
1. The Genetic School 
The main v iews o f th e Genetic School are: 
1. At the momen t of conception all the characteristics of
 
the huma n being are determined genetically. From that po
int 
on, there is a new hum a n b e ing, a separate individual, a man
 
in miniature. From th e moment of c onception the child is an
 
independent for the time being included inside the
 
body of the mother . 
The 1 i fE· is never part of the mother but it is a 
distinct individual human life. the unborn child, l i ke a n y 
other person, can be ill and require treatment before birth,
 
just as it does after birth . 
..,. . _:, . The unborn child asserts a command over the pregnancy . 
( V ) 
( \/ i ) 
the> conceptus initiates the process by which the corpus 
luteum maintains the uterine lining by suppressing men-
struation. It initiates the development of the amniotic sac 
and the placenta for its survival; and it is from the pitui-
tary gland of the fetus that the processes of 1 abour are 
initiated. 
~- The conceptus has the ability to satisfy the two qual-
ities of an individual: unity and uniqueness. E :< cepti ons to 
unity and uniqueness, for example, twinning and chromosomal 
disor ders, occur extremely precociously and do not alter the 
humanity of the being. Abnormalities and diseases such 
the hydatidiform mole kill a conceptus, but do not alter its 
humanity. It is then still a human being, but a. diseased 
one. 
c::-~· · The fz-1ct thal a fetus under 20 weeks has never been 
capable of extra-uterine lif e, and that it is unlikely to 
survive if born before 24 weeks, does not make it any less 
an independent being. Viability depends on the appropriate 
environmc-nt, 
the child 
E!nvi ,onmPnt 
not on the subject in that environment. 
reaches full term and is born. it lives in 
which is most suited to its survival but 
After-
the 
until 
birth it ljves in the environment which is most suitable to 
its survival at that stage. 
b. Terms such as zygote, embryo, and f etus., do no more 
than indicate the stages of development within the uterus, 
and should not be confused with the fact of the existence of 
human life. Life i s already present from conception. 
Be-
conception and death, life does not develop; it is 
al r-eady ther-e. What does change and mature is a morpholog-
i cal stt-ucture, in ~-Jh i eh, as growth continues, 
behavious 
traits, personality, ethical awareness and an appreciaton of 
social responsibilities develop. 
2. The Developmental School : 
Within this school are those who hold that, while conception 
establishes the genetic basis for an individual human being, 
s.on1e dE·gn:=:e of developmE!rit is t-equired befrn-e or1E can lE·-
gitimately speak of the life of an individual human being as 
being an issue in the abortion decision. The Developmental 
School does not accept that the establishment of the genetic 
b ~~ i s  o + i t ~=-e] f v-J i l  1 c ons t i tut e an " i n d i v i du a 1 human be i  n g " . 
Some degree of development of the embryo is required before 
f u] ] humar1 status is 2_ssi gned to it. Those who are per-
:.u2,d ecj to this line of thin~ing believe that life 
continual process with growing stages of significance deser-
vi ,1g different degrees of moral concern. On this view the 
fetus late in development i s recognised as a living 
huma,1 
individual both in form and function. But this s.tatus 
not given to the single cel stage, early in biological 
de\1el opmE1nt. In shrn-t, the view is taken that the human 
individual develops biologicaly in a continuous fashion and 
the possibility is advanced that the rights of a human 
person might develop in the same way. 
On the basis that this view is accepted, a moral policy is 
put fon">lard which proceeds upon the footing that the de-
veloping embryo is not yet a human being, and that, under 
some circumstances, the welfare of the actually existing 
person might supersede the welfare of the developing embryo. 
The main views of those who subscribe to this philosophy 
1.. While conception establishes a genetic basis, some 
degree of development is required before full human s.tatus 
the full genetic code from the time of 
conception proves nothing because after fertilisation two or 
mor E' humar: e>: i stences (twins) can develop with the same 
.., . 
. _:,. A]though the fetus is a potential human being, it 
should not be regarded as acquiring human status until later 
stagE·s 1 r, devel oprnent. 
Three stages in particular are suggested. These ar-e: 
( l) Brain development. The fetus does not have the 
characteristically cerE·br-al substr-atum for 
thc:iught unti] the twenty-eighth to thirty-second week 
of It is suggested that this stage of 
development 1s one at which the fetus can be r-egarded 
as achieving full human status. 
(., ', \.h ab i 1 it y. Until the fetus is capable of 
<viii) 
continuous, independent, extra-uterine existence, it is 
said that it is parasitic upon the mother. Therefor-e, 
up to that stage the fate of such a fetus should be 
vested in the mother alone. 
( 3) ciu i c: k E:.>r·1 i r·1 c;i. Quickening is the stage at which the 
movE•mE·n t s of the fetus can be felt within the mother. 
It is suggested as a stage when the fetus can be recog-
nised as an individual human being. 
of lifE:.> is a value judgmer,t Cctpabl e of 
varying interpretations. 
c::-
..... 1 .. 
t1 on, 
The enormous wastage associated with human r-epr-oduc-
including spontaneous abortion, is seen as evidence 
that life is not regarded by nature as being sacred. 
6. There is a difference between a neurologically undif-
ferentiated organism and a sociallv and mentally integrated 
organism with complex rights and needs. 
7. People feel and react differently to different s;.tages 
of fetal development. 
3. The Social Consequences School 
This school of thought has gained strength from the writings 
of Dr Glanville Williams, and Dr Garret Hardin. Accor-ding 
to the for-mer, in the "Legislation of Medical Abor-tion", the 
decision to call the conceptus a human being is to be made 
( i :-: ) 
on the basis of the social consequences of the dec
ision. 
For his part, Dr Williams would accept viability, which hE•
 
thinks to be socially acceptable, as the dividing line, 
and 
the beginning of brain waves as a possible compromise solu
-
tion. Gan,-et Hardin, in "Abor-tior1 - Dr Compulsory Pregn
an-
C'y':°' 11 says: "Li.JhE~ther thE• fetus is or· is not a human being is
 
a matter of definition, not fact; and we can define it in
 
In terms of the human problem involved, it 
would be unwise to define the fetus as human (hence tact
ic-
a ll y fetus as an 
' unborr, 
child'). the main views of this school are: 
1. Biological facts do not directly dictate the definiti
on 
The decision to call the conceptus a human being is to 
be ma.dE on the basis of the social consequences of the
 
dee i ::,i. or,. 
' ._,. People do not feel the same emotional response 
to the 
zygote and the embryo as they do to the unborn child in the
 
later stages of pregnancy. 
lj • Society has never regarded the fetus as a human being, 
and no nation requires that a dead fetus be treated in the
 
same way as a dead person. 
( i ) The Feport of the F:oyal Commission of Inquiry into 
Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion in New 
1977) pp 18~ - 189 
Zealand. 
(Government Print, New Zealand, 
( '·' ', 
EBBI .!.! • 
~ ~ ~~ 1 . Personhood and Birth 
The White Paper on the proposed Bil of Rights suggests that 
(-)rticle 14· has no applicability to an unborn child. The 
comment vJit.hir·1 the· paper is bt-iE·f: "The possible applica.tion 
of the articl e to abortion depends upon whether the courts 
would consider it as giving rights to a foetus. In Canada, 
the Saska t c he ~·Jan Court of Queens Bench has held that the 
provision of the Canadian Charter 
1 
does not; 
That "c ot-t-· esp ond i ng provision" is. which states: 
117. Evc·r-yor,e ha.s the right to life, libe1rty and security of 
the person and the right not to be deprived thereof e:-: cept 
in 2.ccor-dance ~·Jith t-,e pt-inciples of fundamc•ntctl just.ice. 11 
In Borowski it was aleged that the unborn child ic a person 
and as 
this term was utilised in C 7 ...; ~ . Matheson J. noted 
the various judicial decisions relating to the law of neg-
ligence, and the law of property and child welfare where it 
the does have certain 2 
such as the right not to be injured negligently; 
the right to participate in a gift of property to a class of 
childr-en, even where the children living at the time of the 
test.at.rn-' s death ~'-Jere specified; 
4 
.,. ._:, 
tion frc,m abuse. The court found: 
and the right to protec-
11 Dec i si or,s of this nature are of litle assist-
1 
This 
ance, however, in attempting to answer the ques-
tion whether a foetus is, from the time of concep-
tion or shortly thereafter, a legal person for all 
purposes, because all such decisions involved 
foetuses subsequently born alive, or which it was 
anticipated, unless left unprotected, would be 
born alive." (5) 
"dist.inc:tior1" is aper, to cr-itic:ism. Irrespective of 
whether the unborn child in these cases was or was not later 
bon, the fact remains that the courts acknowledged 
their legal personhood as existing even when they were still 
{.:ictua.11 y, the fact. of subsequent live birth 
s.ofiiE·t i mes nc:,t a material consideration at all in these 
ca.se=:. ·.1 in some it. was not even referred to. 
In the case of a planned termination of the child's life, it 
1~ djfficult to see what relevance that planned termination 
has to the question of legal personality. It is the act in 
the parties (including the child) are involved 
has changed, not anything about the parties themselves. 
Cer-tainly, different acts carry with them different rights, 
and obligations for the parties concerned. An 
indivic.iua] is involved in countless changing relationships. 
and actions in the course of a lifetime and his legal "stat-
u ·::::," changes a'.:, the ci1~cumstances dictatE·, but this is not to 
say that his fundamental status of personhood ever does. A 
condemned crjminal does not cease to be a person, but 
he is a person subject to a death sentence. 
rather 
His change in "status" does not e>:tend to his legal person-
ality. Only in the case of the unborn child doe s this 
happen when it is proposed that its life be taken, if the 
Borowski decision is correct. ----·----·-
T~, E· Bor m'<ls k i --·------·--- decision is in my view interesting, odd and 
undesirable. because the Saskatchewan Court 
r-ecogni sed the need for parliamentary guidance on the 
oing of abortion law; 
"t,lthough rapid ad'-.1ances i,, medical science may 
make it soundly desirable that some legal status 
be extended to foetuses, irrespective of ultimate 
viability, it is the prerogative of Parliament, 
and not the courts, to enact whatever legislation 
may be considered appropriate to extend to the 
unborn any or all legal rights possessed by living 
pers.ons." (t) 
Court 1s here recognising the need to abandon 
arbitrary distinction of personhood based upon birth. 
sha--
the 
The decision is odd, since it has no discernible logical or 
moral cohesion and discriminates against only a selected 
group in society. Its greatest oddity ljes in its inherent 
inconsistency. It is equally (if not more) arguable that 
the principle to be drawn from the cases Matheson J. cites, 
is that the child's legal personhood does (or at 1 ea!:::t 
should) exist in the abortion transaction. 
After all, if it 1s admitted in more peripheral or ancillary 
transactions (such as those involving property rights) 
. .:.:, 
might not we expect it to subsist firstly in more basic and 
essential transactions? Should we not be working from the 
core outwards, not attaching legal personhood to the fringe 
areas and denying it at the core? 
The decision is undesirable because of its uncertainty and 
\'agLteness; it does not contribute to the development of a 
consistent and principled body of law. From the point of 
view of the unborn child it is undesirable as it fails to 
recognise.its most basic interests, while recognising those 
ancillary interests that are so dependent, after all, upon 
the most basic essential interest of life itself. 
Even if one leaves aside the question of ~4,1hether Matheson 
J. 's cone 1 usi on is con-ect ( that the neg 1 i gence and property 
cases are of little assistance regarding the child's 1 egal 
pet- s:.on hood in the area of abortion) as a descriptive state-
mer:t of the way the law has developed; as a prescriptive 
statement arguing for the attaching or stripping 
legal personhood altogether, it has no weight. 
ChaQter 2 _ The S~ntactic AQQroach 
One possible approach to Article 14 1s to compare the use of 
the ~4,1ords "No one" 1 n that Art i c 1 e ~"'i th the other commonly 
4 
used ex p ression foun d in the Bill , "Everyone " . Articles 6 
to 12 (inclusive) 15, 16, 17 (1), 18, 19 and 20 all begin 
s,.Ji th the imper-sonal pronoun "Everyone " . These articles 
concern such matters as the right t o freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (Article 6); freedom of e:-: p ress1 on 
(Article 7); manifestation of religion and bel i ef (Article 
8) ; freedom of peaceful assembly (Ar-ticle 9); freedom of 
association (Article 10 ) ; freedom of movement (Article 1 1 ) 
and freedom from discrimination . Also liberty of the person 
<Article 15); rights on arrest <Article 16) and the minimum 
standard s of criminal justice (Article 17) employ that ev-
pression. Clearl y , these are not matters which concer-n the 
unbor-n child becau se it simpl y has no capacity for them. 
These right s and freedoms are of the kind applicable and 
for practical e x ercisable b y (normally) adult human beings; 
put-poses they have no relevance to those with no capacity 
for them, s uch a s children, including the unborn child, even 
though they ma y appl y to them at some time in the futur-e. 
14 hm-.Jever clearl y holds some relevance for the 
unbot-n child. The right to life must be one of the basic 
human right s upon which all others build and depend. After 
all , it is futile to talk of the right to freedom of as-
sociation (Article 15) if your very life itself is not 
respected as something to which you have a right. So Art-
icle 14 concerns a matter of real essence for the unborn 
child. 
5 
It might be arguerJ th erefore that the word s "No one" have a 
wider meaning than the "Everyone" of those other articles, 
and includes the unborn child to whom it is clearly rele-
vant . Such an argument however is unlikely to find the 
courts' favour. Indeed a similar suggestion was considered 
in Bor_o v-Jsk.i .. . pagE-? 126 of the judgment, Matheson J. 
referred to thE· publication "ThE· Canadian ChartE·r of F:i ghtsc. 
and Freedoms; Commer1tary" (1982), Tarnopolsky and Beaudoin. 
In Chapter 9 of that publication, F'atrice Grant prof erred 
the following comment: 
"As the Charter· uses thF· term "everyonE~" (c.hac.ur:) 
to designate the person entitled to the right 
ctrrd not the E·:-:pressi on "al]. persons" ( toute 
personr:e), perhaps the intention of the 
legislators was to move away from the traditional 
concept of "human person" and to tLwn toi'-Jar-d ·;;:; the 
notion of potei-,t i al per-son so that the "viable 
foetus" ~·Jould be protected by S. 7." 
Matheson J. found little support for this notion 
commenting: 
"Any such intention, as suggested, 1--Jas clearly not 
manifested when the Solicitor-General stated that 
it was truly a matter of indifference to the 
Federal Government whether the expression 
"everyone" or "ever y person" i•Ja~.;:, utilized. 
Minutes of F'roceedings and Evidence of the Special 
Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of 
Commons on the Constitution of Canada, January 22, 
1981, issue No. 43, pp 47-8" 
No such explanatory comment has been made about the language 
1n the New Zealand Bill however, so the argument may not be 
di smi ss.ed so easily . 
6 
Ho~·Jever in the Canadian case there perhaps exists a greater 
distinction between "All persons" (an d everything that tra-
di ti onal 1 y implies) and "Everyone", t han exists between the 
impersonal pronouns of the New Zealand Bill. In other 
words, the argument outlined above for the New Zealand case, 
might run better if the Articles mentioned used 
11 Every person 11 • Indeed, some of the articles in the Bill do 
use this e x pression - Article 21 providing the "F:ight to 
Ju~.ti ce 11 and (.:ir-·ti cl e 18 concerning the "Rights of persons 
F'erhaps "No one" in f'.~r-·ticle· 14 should be con-
trasted l'Ji th the "Everyone" or- "Every person" of the other 
Articles ':;:' t,Je might consi de,~ that "No one" means something 
different from these phrases and that it is coloured by the 
nature of the right being considered. 
Difficulties arise however with Article 19(2) and (3) 
cl.l so emp 1 o y t he ~·Jord s "No one". The·3e read: 
II 17 ( 2) No one shall be liable to conviction of 
any offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute an offence by such person 
under the law of New Zealand at the time it 
occurred. 
17 (3) No one who has been finall y acquitted, 
convicted of, or pardoned for, an offence shall be 
tried or punished for 1t again." 
~..ih i eh 
Cl earl ',' "No one" here does not apply for practical pLwposes 
to children, including the unborn child. But there is 
nothing in the nature of the subject-matter it~.elf 
indicates that it means anything other than the phrases 
7 
"Everyone " or "Every person" as they appear in the other 
articles mentioned . The same people are encapsulated by the 
three differing phrases. So any purely syntactical argument 
is doomed; the contex t simply does not allow such technical 
niceties. The argument in the end, then, is that those 
articles which by their nature may apply to any group neces-
sarily do; the "implication" of the differing t e:<t is e'·'-
posed as a nullity. 
The argument so presented is not such a bad one, except that 
the history of all law relating to pre-natal life indicates 
that somet hing more is required before the right can be read 
as being constitutionally guaranteed. 
Abortion 1 av-Js in Commonwealth jurisdictions generally do not 
expressly deal with the issue of the status of the unborn child. 
Of all the recent Commonwealth cases . only the Nova Scotia case 
F:e c· ~·1 mms ------
this matter- . 
ish F'regnancy 
7 
and H has found in favour of the unborn child in 
In the 1978 case of E~tgo v. Trustees of the ~cit= 
8 
Advisorv Service -------- ------- ' Sir George Baker F' . made this 
general comment about the Commonwealth law: 
8 
"The foetus cannot, in English la1-.J, in my view, have a 
right of its own at least until it is born and has a 
separate existence from its mother. That permeates the 
whole of the civil law of this country ... and is, 
indeed, the basis of the decisions in those countries 
where law is founded on the common law, that is to say, 
in America, Canada, Australia and, I have no doubt, in 
others." (9) 
The E~iQD decision was extempore however, swiftly decided with 
little time for a considered examination of the authorities. the 
judgment was not a considered one, and should be seen as holding 
little weight as authority. 
The facts of the Paton case were as follows: 
Mr Paton applied for an injunction to prevent his wife 
from undergoing an abortion without his consent. His 
wife had obt a ined, pursuant to the Abortion Act, 1967, 
the necessary certificate from registered medical prac-
titioners stating that the were of the opinion that the 
continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk of 
injury to the ph y sical or mental health of the wife. 
The Act gave no right to a father to be consulted in 
respect of the abortion. The Court concluded therefore 
that the husband had no legal right enforceable at law 
or in equit y to veto the abortion. 
The court's conclusion did not, of course, entail an 
e;-: ami nat i or: of rights guaranteed by a constitutionally 
entrenched charter or Bill of Rights. 
9 
Having failed at the Queens Bench, Paton pursued his 
mission before the European Commission of Human Rights: 
10 
E~tgn v. Ynit~g tingggm. 
The European Convention on Human Rights provides in Article 
that: 
"Everyone 's right to life shall be protected 
by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a 
sentence of a court following his 
conviction ... 11 
2 ( 1) 
Consi dE,r i ng what application this held for the unborn, the Com-
missioners noted that no other use of the ~·Jord II Everyone" in the 
Convention indicated a possible pre-natal application, and con-
eluded that Article 2 does not include the unborn. 
Turning to the question of ~·Jhether the ~·Jrn-d 11 1 if e II included 
life, the Commissioners held that an unborn child 
does not have an absolute right to life, since to recognise 
such a right would place higher value upon unborn life than 
upon the life of the pregnant woman, so limiting her own 
right to life which is clearly protected by Article 2(1). 
Such an absolute recognition of unborn life would be con-
tra r y , it ~·Jas observed, to the object and purpose of the 
convention. But to hold that it does not have an absolute 
right to life is not to hold that it has no right to life at all; 
in fact, it infers the contrary. 
10 
Further, the Commissioners confined themselves strictly to the 
facts of the case, which involved the initial stage of pregnancy, 
the woman being only eight weeks pregnant, and medical grounds of 
dangE·r to the woman's life. This accordingly leaves open cont-
r-ary arguments regarding fetuses of more advanced gestational 
age, and abortion indicated on other than medical gr-ounds. It is 
doubtful ho~·Jever that even a viable fetus would found a more 
s;uccessful claim than was presented in E~tQD, as they i,Joul d be 
e :< c: 1 u d e d f r o m t he mean i  n g of II Ever yon e " i  n Ar t i c 1 e 2 ( 1 ) . 
7 r:i ._: . .:.. Morgentaler v. Ib~ ~~~  
11 
In Morgentaler v. it was aleged by the accused and 
by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association and the Foundation 
for Women in Crisis, who were granted standing at the Supreme 
Court of Canada level~ that the amendments to S.251 of the Can-
adian Code, violated women's right to p,1v2.cy, the 
security of the person, the right to appear before therapeutic 
abortion commitees and to a fair hearing, and constituted a 
denial of equality before the law and a denial of due process of 
law, al as provided for by the Canadian Bil of Rights. So this 
case was bought from an opposite stand-point, by those who were 
des.i rous of avoiding the prescribed procedures for authorising 
abortions. -i. e. avoiding the intervention of therapeutic abor-
tion commitees. 
11 
The Supreme Court rejected all of these assertions, commenting 
especially on the need to avoid the temptation of considering the 
12 
wisdom of the legislation. This decision holds no great weighl 
as on the status of the unborn child under Zea-
land's Bjll however, as its focus was a Criminal Code rather than 
a Bill of Rights. Furthermore the issue the Court decided upon 
was the various rights of the mother, and not the status of the 
child. 
The next case of major significance was the Canadian case Dehler 
i3 
This case concerned Mr Dehler, an Ottawa lawyer, 
resentative of those unborn persons or that cl as=:. of unborn 
per-=:.ons 1·JhosE· 1 i ve~,. may bE· tenni natE·d in the defend ant hosp i tzd ", 
claimed injunctive and declaratory relief, the effect of which 
be to prohibit further therapeutic abortions from being 
per-formed in these hospitals. Mr Dehler attempted to establish 
that lega lly protected persons originate at conception or shortly 
thereafter. 
The legislation under attack was subsections (4), • c::-' \ ,_J ,, ., (6) and 
(7) of S.251 of the Criminal Code - the same Act in contention in 
Morgentaler, and Robins J. found nothing in the facts as alleged 
14 
which would impel a different conclusion. 
12 
second question facing the court wa s whether Mr Dehler had 
the status or standing to maintain an action on behalf of these 
unborn persons. Robins J. approached the question by asking: 
H·i c:: ~ .~ 
"v~hethe,~ the members of the class the plaintiff rep-
t-esents, the unborn children whose lives may be term-
inated by abortion, could themselves have the required 
status or standing to prosecute the action and by con-
sidering, as is implicit in the question, the rights of 
the unborn children to the relief sought in this case. 
If the unborn cannot individually maintain the action, 
they cannot maintain it collectively, nor- c2,n it b e 
majntained cl as5:. action on behalf. .. it 
should bE· noted, the plaintiff claims entirely in a 
representative capacity asserting no personal rights 
enforceable in law or equity upon which to found this 
c:1.ction". (15) 
prosecute an action) was an emphatic NO. He ackncw-Jl edged 
the unborn child had been attributed various rights by 
to 
that 
but 
reiterat ed the constant them e of the abortion law cases, that the 
unbo1-r1 child 1s r~::cluded f1~om the legal concept of "per-sons" . He 
found sup po r- t i n t h i s f t- o m F· o 1 1 o c I,· i n h i s II Fi r s t Book of Jur-is-
pr·udence" (at p. 110). 
"Persons are the subjects of r-ights and duties: and as 
the subject of a right, the person is the object of the 
correlative duty. A person is such, not because he is 
human, but because rights and duties are ascribed to 
1::::; 
him. The person is the legal subiect or substance of 
which the rights and duties are attributes. An 
individual human being, considered as having such 
attri butE:'S is ~·Jhat 1 a ~'II YE'r--s call c:'. natural person. 
II 
--------
This quote presents a purely positivistic perception of the law, 
which is not the only perception. In fact rights and duties are 
less commonly ascribed than r-ecognised by 1 avJ as already 
subsisting in persons. 
Robins J. continued: 
11 ?:i foE'tus, ~,JhatE•ver its stage of development, is 
recognized as a person 1n the full sense only after 
birth. In the law of torts or property, 1n cases 
involvino inheritance or pre-natal injury, a foetus 
would have no rights if stillborn. Only upon live 
birth can rights acquired during gestation be asserted. 
In none of the decisions to which I have referred or of 
which I am aware, has the foetus been regarded as a 
person before its birth. In short, the law has set 
birth as the line of demarcation at which personhood is 
realized, at which full and independent legal rights 
attac h, and until a child en ventre sa mere sees the 
light of day it does not have the rights of those 
a] r-e a d y born." ( 1.6) 
This par t of hj s judgment 1s difficult and his interpretation of 
the tort and propert y cases he refers to is open to criticism. 
Robin s J. correctl y asserts th a t '' onl y upon l j ve birth can rights 
acquired during gestation be asserted." but the most important 
point to be taken from these cases is that the rights were 
a c q u i r e d by , or n,~ c o g n i s e d as e;: i s t i n g i n , the c h i l d ~-J h i 1 e i t ~'II as 
s.t i 11 pr, The unborn child is' in F'ollock ' s 
terms, "the subject of rights and duties" and is therefor-·e a 
"person ·•. Even if one accepts Pollock ' s positivistic perception 
1 Lj 
of law and legal personality as being correct therefor-e, the 
conclusion it leads to (in light of the tort and property cases) 
is that the unborn child is a "person". 
It 1S true also that in the tort and property cases the unborn 
child would have no action to maintain if stillborn. But this 
sa\,..-s nothing about. the "persor,hood" of the unborn child; it 
certainly does not justify the conclusion that the unborn child 
has no legal personhood. An analogy may be found in common law. 
At common law no person can maintain a tort action if the injury 
complained of kills him; dead people cannot bring claims. But 
this is purely a practical measure designed to reduce litig3lion. 
It in no way removes their personhood before death; on the con-
trary it affirms it. The courts have merel y imposed a 
tion upon litigants; the y must be alive to bring the action. 
J n the cases referred to by Robins J. the, rights 
r E·cogni sed as existing in an unborn person have been held to be 
justjcjable onlv upon live birth. But as is explained above this 
1S a purely practical rule designed to prevent court action b';/ 
people who lack actual capacity to litigate. It does not imply 
that have no or even less personhood at the time of the 
injury than at the time of the court action: rather it affirms. 
their pers.onhood still unbonrn. Under this 
approach therefore, the practical measure restricting litigation 
i.s thE• hub of Rob i nS:. becornes simply 
15 
It is arguable that Robins J. may have been incorrect therefore 
in that "In none of the deci si or-is to ~.,ih i eh I havE· 
referred or of which I am aware, has the foetus been regarded as 
a before itc~ bir-th." It is respectfully submitted that 
thi '.:; •. view confuses the practical rules of enforcement of a per-
son's rights with the concept of personhood itself. 
Thi=· contusion permeates many of the decisions dismissed in this 
and 1s a central issue 1n abortion i ntETpretat ion. 
Sometimes the judges explain the tort actions mai r:tai ned upon 
] i '· / C::. birth 2:-3 involv:i.r1e;: E>. "le(;ial fiction" recognising t-ights 
the unborn retroactively. Matheson J. 1n Borowski -------·-
talked of: 
II t! .. ;E• creation of a legal fiction ... not unknown to the 
1 egal l cH·'J ••• that a potential human being be deemed a 
person contingent upon the potential human 
achieving thE s.tatu5. of a.n a.ctual human bE·ing." 
I- . 
.JeJ. rig 
( 1 7) 
Th ere are difficulties with this view. lt is not at all clear 1n 
5.en::-e the termc:- npotentii:.•.l human beings" and "actual human 
beinqs" are beinq used here. Historically there has been great 
in the biological ano medical sciences as to humari 
life begin'.:::. The current state of the debate is unclear but it 
15. es.tablished beyond doubt that the qualification "potential" is 
inaccurate in describing foetal life (i.e. an unborn child enters 
its foetal stage six wEeks after conception). Ac most abortions 
the eighth week it is medically 
incorrect to ref er to a woul d-be-app 1 i cant c"is a "potential human 
16 
bE:?inq". 
EvE:'n if used in a metaphysical sense, the birth distinction is 
outmoded and inapproriate. It appears that the terms are in the 
end used in a purel y legal sense. The "fiction" then is not in 
thE:' "deeming" of c.<. "potential humc:~n being" to be an "actual human 
being" but in thE:' legal dE·fir1ition of "per-son hood" as arising 
upon li\1e bit-th, which effectively deems actual human beings to 
be "potentj c.11" 
Dehler's principal contention was that the legal issues wer-e 
so dependent upon or intertwined with the unresolved questions of 
for their proper determination that the action should pro-f .::,Ct 
ceE·d to trial so that the necessary facts could be established. 
ThE' essential fact he sought to prove was that the unborn arE· 
humar, being s from the moment of conception. From it he a,~gued 
that the unborn, as human beings from conception, have a right to 
life and to full protection of the law and that Parliament cc,uld 
not constitutionally confer on a doctor the 'right' to kill an 
unborn person, or upon the mother the 'right' to an abortion. 
F:ob ins J. would have none of this however. that "the 
question of when human life beings is one which has perplexed the 
SctCJeS down thE· COl'T i dors of time", he felt that "even the 
thec,logical, philosophical, medical and jurisprudential issues 
involved 1n it could be answered in a court-reiom, the 
i·muld be beside the point, in so far as this lawsuit is con-
cer-ned. Accepting as fact the conclusion the plaintiff seeks to 
17 
establish by testimony at trial, that is, that a fetus is a human 
beinc.~ fr-om conception, the legal result obtained remains the 
samE·. The fetus is not r-ecognjsed 1n law as a per-son in the ful 
18 
1 eg ,:d sense. " 
plaintiff therefore had no status to maintain thE• action, 
since a representative cannot have greater power to act that the 
party claimed to be repr-esented, and unborn persons have no power 
to have proceedings br-ought on their-behalf. 
J" found it significant that the plaintiff Dehler could 
cite no cases supporting his ar-gument. 
The plaintiff's case was dismissed without any evidence ever 
being adducE'}O, and the decision of Robins J. was affirmed by the 
19 
Ontario Court of Appeal without r-easons and an application for 
2() 
leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was refused. 
3.4 ~~!! v. Livingston ~ ~ 8Q~QC9b 
21 
The New Zealand case of ~~11 v. Livinoston and Bg~gcg~, 
influenced in in 
Zealand no direct claim of standing could be spelt out of the 
mere existence of a fetus. 
In this case a teenage gir-1 was referred by her- own doctor-to a 
18 
public hospital for medical investigation of a suspected comp-
lication arising from a known heart complaint. The symptoms were 
found to be due to early pregnancy. She was then refer-red to two 
certifying consultants in terms of S. 32 of the Contraception, 
Stt:>r-i lisat.:i.c:m and Abor-tion Act j Q77 ' ' ' ' ,...,ho issued a c:er-tificate 
authorising the abortion. 
During the perjod the gir-1 was under examination in the hospital, 
she was seen by the plaintiff Dr-. Wall, who in fact diagnosed her-
symptom s -:::1s mor-ning sickness. Based upon the knowledge he had 
O,:l.i nE' CJ of the gir-1 during her per-iod in the hospital and a dis·-
cussion he had with a cardiological specialist, thE• 
op inion that there were no grounds within the provisions of the 
Act u pon whi c h an abortion could be justified. 
Dr- . VJal 1 accordingly sought an injunction or declaration to the 
effect that th e cer-tificates author ising perfor-mance of the abor-
t j on i n ' .1 a l id. The judgment of the Court of Appeal 
b y l•Joodhouse F'. who had this general comment to make 
about the New Zealand scheme: 
"it 1 c.:. i mportar,t not tc:., lose sight of "Jh2.t must have 
been a deliberate Parliamentary decision: the avoidance 
of any attempt to spel] out what wer-e to be regarded as 
the leg,:d rights in an unborn child: with the 
consequential absence of anv statutory means by which 
rights (whatever their natur-e ) could be enforced.'' (22) 
He made two br-oaci points. Firstly that the New Zealand ~-c:heme 
clearly i r1d i c:ated that Parliament intended no general right of 
judicial review of decisions made under it, any such jurisdiction 
would extend pr-obably only to bad faith claims. Secondly on the 
19 
question of locus standi that 
"no individual ,'llho 
participants could 
sufficient interest 
judicial revi e,•J." (23) 
is 
ever 
to 
not one of the statutory 
be regarded as h av ing a 
institute proceedings for 
Tr1e "statutrn~y pE1rti ci pants" probably include only the 11-Joman 
seeking the abortion plus the two or three certifying consultants 
who make t h e authorisation decision. The "status" of the unborn 
child in New Zealand abortion law is therefore unclear. 
The? long title to the Contraception Sterilisation and Abcwt ion 
Act describes itself as, amongst other things: 
But 
"{cin {~1ct ... to provide for- the cit-cumstances and 
procedures under which abortions may be authorised 
after having full regard to the rights of the unborn 
child." 
as Woodhouse P. pointed out (see above), these rights 
have not been spelt out and no one may be heard to argue for them 
21.1 
3.5 lo Re §i~~2 and H: 
Io is the only recent case to step out of line 
these other authorities, but it involved interpretation of 
the Children's Services Act 1976 rather than of underlying common 
law principle:~. The case arose 1n the Family Court when a hus-
band, upset at his estranged wife 's successful application for 
therapeutic abortjon, applied for an injunction from the provin-
cial Supreme Court to restrain the abortion . 
2(.1 
The Supreme Court hearing was scheduled for a short time ahead, 
the judge in the Family Court would have been unavailable 
the day of hearing he was conducting. The Family Court 
concerned not the father whose proceedings were pending 
in Sup r emf? Court , but one Dorothy Simms who was locally 
active in opposing abortion. She made an application under 5.56 
of the Children's Services Act 1976 (N.S.) to be appointed guar-
dian ad l1tem of the unborn child for the purpose of representing 
the unborn child in the proceedings to be brought by the father . 
The Familv Court Judge, Bartlett J., bearing in mind the need for 
26 
a speedy decision, read the provincial Act to apply to an 
u n t, rn- n c h i 1 d , and gr- .::rn t e d the a pp 1 i c at. i on perm i t t i n g Mrs Si mm s. t o 
appec:,.r ctS guar- di an ad ]item in the Supreme Court proceedings 
schedu.l E· for hearing four days later. In fact, the hosp i. tal 
y ielded to the threat of litigation and cancelled the therapeutic 
abortion~ so the High Court proceedings were not pursued. 
The case has raised significant questions, however, not only upon 
the proper reading of the Children's Services Act 1976, but alsc, 
Ltpon a Family Court can give status to participate 1 n 
Hi-gh Court proceedings. Being at the lowest level of the hier-
arch v of Courts, the case hold s little weight a~ precedent. 
3.6 The Lahache case -------
2l 
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In a recent Fr e nch case the f a th e r of th e unborn child un s uc -
cessfully attempted to claim d a mag es from the hospital 
per-for-me d a b orti o n at hi s wi f e's r e quest. Mm e Lah a c he r e-
ques t ed an abor ti on wh ic h was per fo r med at th e Hospi t a l Cent r e o f 
Dinan before t h e end o f t h e tenth week of p regnancy . Th e s t a t -
sc h e me o per ati ng was t he Code o f Public Heal th which al -u tor-y 
~:~8 
1 rn•-JS a n y p r egnan t wo man, who considers tha t h e r-· c on d it ion 
(preiJ1-,E1ncy) has put r,E·t-· in a situation of s tr ess an d ~',i h O h as 
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carried out t he necE·ssary consul t ati o ns, t o obto.in a ter-
minatior, of pregnancy before the end o~ the t enth wee !:: . 
Included in th.:1t s.chemE? is the di,..-ection t hat "each time i t is 
po·:':.si b 1 e, the couple should take part in consultation a nd in the 
3t) 
decision to be taker," In fa c t, Mr Lahache was not invited to 
take part in the consultation, and i t was upon this ground th2t 
h E sued the hospital for 150,000F. 
Ha vino fai l ed at the lower hearing (the administrative Tribunal 
of F~ennes) he appealed to t h e Co uncil of St.ate. The Council 
noted t hat the prov ision in question was purely optional in 
character and that neither the fact of the failure to consult Mr 
L_ahache, nor his willingness to come to his estranged 
assi s-,t .:3.nce in the event of he,..- having the child constituted 
legal obstacle to the decision to abo,..-t . 
3.7 The Q~QfQCib and ~§~g Cases 
'":'• -. 
~..:.. 
a 
The United States Supreme Court had occasion to 
31 
consider- the 
constitutional validity of a Missouri abortion statute in E:!_§.Q= 
The provisions of the statute attacked which are 
interest to the New Zealand situation were: 
of potential 
( 1 ) s. :; ( 3) a spousal consent provision, r-equi red thE:' prior 
1•Jr-i t ten consent of the spouse of a woman seeking Cln abor-tion 
during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, unless the abortion wer-e 
cer-tified by a physician to be necessary for preservation of the 
mo ther-'s life. 
3 ( l:j.) a p a rental consent provision~ required, with respect 
t o the first 12 weeks of pregnancy where the pregnant woman is 
un ma r- r 1 eel and under 18 years of age, the written consent of 
pa,r-ent or person 1n loco par-entis unless the abortion were cer-
t if i ed b°)/ a physician as necessary for pr-eservation of the 
mother's life. 
Reference was mad e in the court's decision regarding both the 
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pr-ovisions to the watershed case of Roe v. ~~~~ 1"1hi eh forms the 
of American abortion law. The judgment of thE• Supr-eme 
Court 1n Wade was delivered by Blackmun J. (similarl y for the 
Q~ofgcib case) who, after giving an historical over-view of Amer--
ican state abortion law turned to a consideration of the right to 
privacy. Acknowledging that the Constitution does not explicitly 
mention any such right, he affir-med its existence by implication, 
several decisions in which the Court has found in varying 
conte:-: ts at least the roots of that right under assorted 
visions of the constitution. 
The Court concluded that the: 
"right of pr-i vc.1cy, whether it be f oundE·c:I in the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and 
restrictions upon state action, or, as the District 
Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation 
of rights to the people is broad enough to encompass a 
woman 's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
It emphatically rejected 1 hc.wJe\ier, 
thE? woman's right is absolute and that she is entitled 
pro-
minate her pregnancy at whatever time, and fo,~ 
i·Jh at. e\1er- reason she a.lone c h oos.es. '' . 
lhi~; right "must bE· cons.iderE·d ao.:.:i.inst important state 
3t:, 
l f'l recJulation" Indeed the Court noted that the 
"pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privac'/" for- she "car-
:"7 ._, ,· 
ries an embryo and, later. a fetus'' It i··Jas therefot-e "re2.s-
onable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point 
in time another interest, that of health of the mother or that of 
potent i a.l hu.mcffl ] if E'' become=- significa.r1t] v involved. 
woman's privacy i s no lonoer sole and any right of 
38 
poss.esses must be measured accordingly" 
privacy 
The 
she 
The Court then established the three trimester divis i on which has 
become the measuring stick for American state abortion law. "For 
t.hEc> st .,3.ge prior to appr-o;: i met le] y the end of the first trimester, 
24 
the abortion decjsion and its effectuation must be left to the 
medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending 
39 
without state interference. 
Phvsician" 
' ' 
The state acquires a legitimate inter-est in protecting ''potential 
1 i f e II a p p ,,- o ;: i ma t e 1 y a t t h E· E· n d of t h t? sf? c on d t ,,- i m fist e ,,- , when the 
fetus has becomE· "vi ab] E·". i::1t this stage thr:> statE· "may, if it 
choos.es, and even proscribe, abortion except where it 
in appropriate medical judgment, for- the pr-e-
40 
ser-vation of the 1 if e or- he.:.d th of the mother- 11 • Dur- i ng the 
sec::orrd ~ or- middle trimester-, the state may, it it chooses, r-eas-
onably regulate the abortion procedure in the inter-est of promo-
tjng the health of the mother-, but it may not 
•l 1 
consti tuti oncd 1 y 
prohibit abortions altogether-. 
Danforth relied heavily upon this case 1n coming to the following 
co11c 1. usi ons: on the constitutionality of the provisions 1 n the 
Missouri hct. 
(1:o The =·Pou se _· s. consent. -------
3(3) required the prior- written consent of the spouse of 
the woman seeking an abortion during the first 12 weeks of pr-eg-
nancy unless "the a.bo,--tion is cer-tifiE·d bv 2, ] icer,sed physician 
to be necessary in order- to preserve the life of the mother". 
The Court noted with interest that the condition did not relate, 
as most statutory conditions in that area do. to the preservation 
Lj :;::, 
of the lie or b§~ltb of the mother. 
The provision was defended on the ground that it was enacted in 
the light of marriage as an institution. Reference was made to 
an abortion's possible effect on the woman's childbearing po-
tential. It was established that marriage always has entailed 
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legislatively imposed limitations and argued that it 
legitimate for the legislature to exercise its inherent policy-
mc:1king prn...,iflr- to determine that "a change in the family structure 
S-E•t mDt:i.crn by mutual con<::;ent should bEc 
4-<'l 
mutual consent .. " 
only 
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two physicians attacking the legislation contended 
<:::.ecti on ~~; (3) was obviously designed to afford the husband 
by 
that 
the 
right unilaterally to prevent or veto an abortion, whether or not 
h e was the father of the child. 
In (both decided in the same 
'/E.':.'l r) the Supreme Court specifically reserved decision on the 
quE:,S t. ion whether a requirement. for consent b v the father of the 
unbor-n child, bv the spous.e, or b y the parents. or by a parent, 
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of an unmarried minor, may be constitutionally imposed. 
In Danforth the Court specifically confronted with the question 
and it responded 
"L·Je nov·J 
requi ,-e 
under- s .. 
abortion 
hold that the state ma y not constitutionally 
the consent of the spouse, as is specified 
3(3) of the Missouri Act, as a condition for 
during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy". (48) 
This was a clear and necessary conclusion foll m•Ji ng from the 
inability of the state to regulate or proscribe abortion during 
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the first trimester, 
"we cannot hold that the state has the constitutional 
authority to give the spouse unilaterally the ability 
to prohibit the wife from terminating her pregnancy, 
when the state itself lacks that right." (Ll9) 
This conclusion was arrived at despite a specific recognition of 
"deep and proper concern and interest that a devoted and 
protective husband has in his wife's pregnancy and in the growth 
5() 
and de-....,-elopment of thE? fetus shE· is carrying." The court also 
refer--red to the "profound effE·cts on the future of any marriage, 
effects that 
51 
are both physical and mental, 
tc,rious" that an abortion may produce. 
and po!::.sibl-.,.- dele-
Thr? cow-t noted the idE·al of a. mutual decision to "terminate" but 
found jt 
The 
"difficu]t to believe that the qoi::tl of fostering mu-
tuality and trust in a marriage, and of strengthening 
the marital relationship and the marriage institution, 
will be achieved by giving the husband a veto power 
E·>; ere i sab 1 E· f c:w an '/ r-e.-::-1son ot·- 110 r-eason at all ". ( 52) 
of the prov ision would open the way for 
uni 1 ateral decisi o n by the woma n, but this could be justified 
1
' The ob \/i OLl~- fact (is) that when the wife and the 
husband disagree on this decision, the view of only one 
of the two marriage partners can prevail. Inasmuch as 
it is the woman who physically bears the child and who 
1s the more directly and immediately affected by the 
pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weiohs in 
her fa. \/ C•Ltr 11 .. (53) 
a 
The co•_tr-t cone) uded tha.t s. 3 ( 3) wa s unconstitutional as incon-
s1stent with the standards enunciated in Roe v. Wade. 
~~ The Parental CQQ§§Qt ~rovision 
This p1·-ovision, requiring the written consent of one parent 
27 
in loco parentis where the woman is unmarried and under 
the age of 18 years and the pregnancy is advanced less than 12 
weeks, was also found unconstitutional. Just as with the re-
quirement of consent from the spouse, this provision purported to 
give a third pa,~ty "an ab<:.;olute, and possible arbitrary, veto 
the decision of the physician and his patient to terminate 
the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding 
5·1 
the cons.ent." As such it violated the strictures of 89~ v. 
Zealand, has not explicitly adopted the "viabilitv·" and 
approach of the American system. An argument 
still be raised however, in support of an unborn child's 
1 . c~a1m under Article l~ of the draft Bill of F:ights, that the 
attainino of the age (or staoe) of viability promotes the unborn 
to the class of beings encapsulated by the phrase "no-one" in 
ad:i cl e 14. 
Such a claim might draw upon the traces of the viability notion 
present in New Zealand scheme which give greater recognition of 
c::-c::-
....J....J 
the right to life of a viable foetus. 
The adoption of such an approach ,"JOUl d create many 
di ff i c u 1 ties. for the New Zealand Courts however, if it 
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simply 
adopted the BQ~ formula. 
4.1 The 8Q~ definition 
decision is one of the most controversial pieces of 
constitutional jurisprudence ever to be handed down by the Arne,~-
i car1 Supreme Court. This results not only from its con-
stitution.::11 analysis, but also from its strong reliance on med-
ical definitions and theories which, at the time of the decision, 
did not themselves have a majority of support within the medical 
5t1 
field. 
There are two problems which flow from the definitions of "'·.'l -
abiljty which underpinned the Bg~ decision. Firstly, the def-
inition utilized by the Court is one about ~-Jhich physicians 
~;econd]y, E•\/E'n if there was adequate medical and 
scientific justification for the court's definition in 1973, the 
rate of change of feta] technology is so great as to render that 
definition outdated (and it may be anticipated that the advances 
i r1 neonatol og·y, ectogenesi s ., and fetal technology will in the 
lono run only serve to defeat the intention of the court in 
by providing "viability" at or near conception). 
It was noted above (p.25) that viability was the point at 
the court found the state's interest in "potential life" became 
suffjciently compelling to justify regulation of abor-tion. The 
Court defined viability as that point when the fetus is "paten-
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tially able to live outside of the mother's womb, albeit with 
artificial aid. Viability is usually placed at about seven 
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months. (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks". 
Furthermor-e ., the Court found that it is at this time ~"'hen the 
fetu<:::. "pt-esumab ly has the capability of meaningful life outside 
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the mother · s v-Jornb". 
It is this seemingly arbitrary definition of viability which is 
the focus of the controversy surrounding BQ~- On the one hand 
the ~urt conceded that it ~'·Jasin no position to determine ~o.Jhen 
human lifE· bE·gir,s. Or, the otrH?r ha.nd, they found 
themselves capable of determining ~..ihen "meaningful life'' be<;iins. 
Cine mioht ~·-Jel] asi,: hm·~ the onE· quE•st ion is possible of deter-
mination yet not the other; the two questions being of the same 
the incapacity must pervade both issues. Further-
the declaration of vi abi 1 i t·y t,ei ng at t ~-Jent y-f our to 
WE•E·?ks 1s no more a matter of consensus amongst 
ffiE•diCE:1.l practitionet-·:;; than is the definition of "viability" as 
the point at which the fetus i s potential]y able to live outside 
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t h e irm m b " a l b C= i t ~"' i t h a r t i f i c i 2, l • I JI a 1 o • 
The determination in BQ~ 1s based upon certain theories of fetal 
development which even if correct at the time, may not be flex-
1ble enough to accommodate the growth and development of fetal 
sciences which have occurred since then. The developing problem 
is that these advances have the inevitable effect of pushing the 
date of viability continually back to earlier points in ges-
3<) 
tat ion. 
The end result of this tendency is obvious. For America, states 
will be quite within the constitutional boundaries established by 
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in proscribing abortions at continually 
earlier points in gestation, as the point at which their interest 
become::>s 11 compel 1 i ng 11 moves. bac I:: ~·Ji th advances in f etal technology 
anc1 neonatal Dgy. For New Zealand the consequences of the Bill of 
F:ights dj scuss.ed in this paper would occur at an earlier 
tational staqe if she were tD adopt the American approach. 
In the Danforth case the court emphasised the role of the medical 
1n determining viability and downplayed the time 
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scale set in Roe. This creates further difficulties making the 
viability concept an arguably inappropriate one. The practition-
er is. faced ~·iith a difficult tasl,: in determining viability ~·Jhen 
the fetus is in utero; there are simply no accurate indications 
of '.riability. 
li.Jei ghi r1g 1S impossible while the fetus remains in est-
. +- . 1ma.~1ng feta 1 age 1s imprecise, depending as it does upon 
patient's memory, and truthfulness and being subject to irreg-
uiarities in menstruation. Amniocentesis usually yields no re-
sults until about the twenty-first week of pregnancy~ ~.,,herea s 
most abortions are performed before the twentieth week. Ultra-
sonography is normally not accurate until the third trimester. 
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One American's report concluded that: 
considering the biological variations in each pregnancy 
and the imprecision of measuring fetal maturity, the 
physician faces an insurmountable task in attempting to 
place viability before performing an abortion. 
Given the complications the various artificial aids to main-
taining fetal life add, the task may become well nigh im~g§= 
sibl_e for the practitioner. 
ThE::• concept of viability is present in New Zealand abortion 
also, but the drafting of her scheme saves her the difficulties 
outlined above which confront the Americans. 
In these difficulties arise from the explicit LISE• and 
dEfinitjon of the v-Jord "viability" in her· case la1•Js . . 
Zealand statutor·y scheme the word viability is not e;: p 1 i C i t 1 y 
same way as is America's abortion law. New Zealand avoids the 
difficulty of defining viabiljty. 
ThE' concept is present in the New Zealand scheme hov-Jever. 
appears explicitly in S. l82A of the Crimes Act, 1961 
defines miscarriaoe: 
"s. l82A Miscan-iaqe defined: 
<a' the destruction or death of an embryo or 
fetus after implantation; or 
(b) the premature expulsion or removal of an 
embryo or fetus after implantation, otherwise 
than for the purpose of inducing the birth of 
a fetus believed to be viable or removing a 
-:rr-, 
... )L 
It 
I...Jh i eh 
fetus that has died." (emphasis added) 
The viabi lit y concept appears implicitly in s.187A of the Crimes 
Act which sets out grounds upon which abortions may lawfully be 
performed. These grounds are exceptions to the crime of inducing 
a mi scar-ri age. 
s. 187{~ of the Crimes Act provides that an a bm- ti on of a 
pregnancy of more than twenty weeks gestation is unlawful unless 
the person performing the abortion believes that the miscarriage 
ThesE-? 
necessary to save the life of the woman or girl or to 
prevent serious permanent injur y to her physical or 
mental hE·al th. 
grounds are much narrower than the exemptions outlined 1n 
s. 187{-i (1) and (2) which apply to pregnancies of not more than 
twenty weeks gestation. These are: 
s. 187A (i) (a) That the continuance of the pregnancy would 
t-esult in serious danger (not being 
danger normally attendant upon 
childbirth) to the life. or- to the 
physical or mental health, of the woman 
DI~ g1rl ... ; 
or 
[[(aa) That there is a substantial risk that the 
child, if born, would be so physically 
or mentally abnormal as to be seriously 
handicapped; orJJ 
(b) That the pregnancy is the result of sexual 
intercourse between -
(i) A parent and child; or 
(ii) A bt-other and sister, ~·Jhether of 
the whole blood or of the half 
b 1 ood; rn-
( iii) A grandparent and grandchild; or 
(c) That the pregnancy is the result of sexual 
intercourse that constitutes an ottence 
against section 131 (1) of this Act; or 
..::, .. :.:: 
(d) That the woman or girl is severly subnormal 
within the meaning of section 138 (2) of 
this Act. 
(?' The following matters, while not in themselves 
grounds for any act specified in section 183 
or section 186 of this Act, may be taken into 
account in determining for the purposes of 
subs!--?cticm (1) Cc•.) of this section, whether 
the continuance of the pregnancy would result 
in serious danger to her life or to her 
physical or mental health: 
(a) The age of the woman or girl concerned is 
near the beginning or the end of the 
usual child-bearing years: 
(b) The fact (vJhere such is the case) that 
there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that the pregnancy is the 
re:'.;ult of rape. 
Th e New Zealand s cheme is therefore similar to the American law 
F:oe Until "viability" (thought by the American 
Supreme CeiLu-t to occur around twE•nt y-f our ~..,,eei::s) state regulation 
o f abor-tion was limited (see abo v e p.25). After 11 viabilit}," the 
could regulate or even proscribe abortion except wher-e i t 
1 s necessar y for the preservation of the life or health of the 
meither. These are very nearly the same grounds as appear in 
s .1871'-i (3) of the New Zealand Crimes Act which comes into pl2o y 
a.f ter- twenty weeks gestation. So some viability-type notion is 
present in the New Zealand set of e x emptions. 
But by a v o i d i n g the use of the ~·Jo~- d II v i a b i 1 i t y 11 and the def-
inition of that stage in the wa y Roe v. ~~~~ did, New Zealand has 
largely avoided the legal difficulties presented by the new 
technologies discussed above. 
The New Zealand legislation does recognise the viable foetus as 
having a greater right to life under s.187A (3) of the Crimes Act 
therefore and one might argue that this should also be recognized 
constitutionally undE't~ hrtjcle 14. "Viability" would be ar-
set out twenty weeks as per s. 187A(3) of the Crimes 
Act avoiding some of the difficulties facing the American Courts. 
Debate z~bout the arbitrariness of the twenty week 1 i mi t ~·JOUl d 
re!::,ul t, but presumably that has occurred already when it 
introduced bys. 187A (3) of the Crimes Act. 
'i.3 "Termination" ~§.!.. "Feticide" 
Even leaving this whole problem aside the new fetal technolog y 
still presents New Zealand legislators with a major difficult y 
which challenges the Americans also. That is, it presents them 
with the problem of whether abortion implies a right to destroy a 
fetus or merely to terminate a pregnancy. 
Hi strn- i c2,l l y, termination of pregnancy has necessarily involved 
feticide. The development of ectogenesis however is destroy ing 
the necessary fusion of the two aspects of what we loosely term 
"abortion". 
This is an exciting development as it may potentially serve to 
reconcile the competing interests at stake in the abortion trans-
c:ict ion, but first the law must differentiate the two aspects. 
Certainly the New Zealand statutes and the Commonwealth and 
American cases operate and were decided Wl.t hin that narrower~ 
framework where the one aspect necessarily implies the other. 
Literally meaning 'outside beginning· ectogenesis refers to var-
jous techniques enabling a fetus to experience part of its pre-
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natal development outside the mother's womb. There are two types 
of E•ctogc>nesi s. "F'r·eimplantational ectogenes.is" ~"-lhich its 
sugges.t s, refers to the extra-uterine maintenance of the 
fetus prior to its implantation in the uterus. 
"F'ost implant at i onal ectogr::>nesi s" concerns. extra-uterine main-
tenance of the fetus from that time on, either 1n an artificial 
~'-Jomb for the period of time the fetus spends outside its 
original womb while being transferred to the womb of a surrogate 
moth et-. 
It 1s to the development of an artificial placenta, an artificial 
and the perfection of methods of fetal transference that 
the largest effort in post implantational ectogenesis 
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is cur-
rently directed. We are becoming more familiar with the re-
sults of implantational ectogenesis with the successes in the 
area of in-vitro fertilization and the possibilities which sur-
rogacy are opening up. 
As yet, there has been no complete in-vitro artificial gestation, 
36 
though the necessary technology is currently available. "With 
the progress of ectogenetic technology, a total in y(tCQ system 
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of gestation is inevitable in the near future." 
This could conceivably reconcile the competing interests of the 
state and the pregnant woman. The woman's interest is primarily 
in terminating her pr-egnancy, the state's interest is in pr-o-
tecting unborn life, which it does through the provisions of the 
Crimes Act proscribing abortion except on certain grounds. Using 
ectogenetic techniques, both interests may be accommodated; the 
can choose to terminate her pregnancy, and the state may 
e::erci se its interest in protecting fetal life by use of an in 
vitro gestational device, or by use of a surrogate mother. 
In the states could arguably proscribe abortion (which 
implies feticide) altogether as ectogenesis can be 
an "artificial a i d " vJ i t h i 11 the F: o e de f i n i t i on of 
viabilit)/. New Zealand is fortunately spared this constitution-
al dilemma as she avoids a direct r-eference to "viability" in her 
abortion equations. With the pushing back of the viabjlity date 
occurring through ectogenesis, New Zealand legislators may even-
tually be faced with the question of exactly what the right to 
abortion entails. 
In fact to resolve that it entailed only the right to termination 
of pregnancy and not feticide would require readily available 
options in the form of artificial gestation apparatus or sur-
rogate mothers for most of the six thousand odd women 
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currently having abortions in New Zealand every year. 
It would also raise nice questions as to who was responsible for 
the child and who should pay the costs of his or her life. Would 
r esponsibility revert to the woman once the conditions which 
precipitated the termination of the pregnancy no longer e:-: i sted-:::' 
Would the father have to bear responsibility? Could he if he so 
desired? Would the child become a ward of the state? 
It can be seen what a minefield this whole area quickly becomes; 
we are already experiencing man y of these difficulties with the 
of in vitro fertilization, third party do-
nations of semen etc. 
Bucl.Jey, in his ar-ticlE·, 
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"Current Technology Affecting Supreme 
Coui~t Jur i s.pr-ud E·n CE· " foresees another difficulty too. if 
scenar io outlined above were to realize. 
"t:i sort of mora] or- ethic2.l dilemma. ~..,ould be c~-eated 
for the woman which would negatively affect her freedom 
of choice. Certainly, fewer women will choose to abort 
1f they know that the fetus will survive and then 
ei t.her- bE~ give n for adoption or 1 eft to thE· slate. "69 
As=:.umi ng that article 14 does apply to the unborn child 
assumption ~"'hi eh indicated above 1s far from being a 
one) what would be its effect? Article 14 reads: 
. .::,8 
the 
(an 
sure 
"No on e s h a ll b e d e pri v ed of l if e e :-: c e pt on such 
gr o und s , a nd, wh e r·e appli cabl e , in ac cordance with such 
procedures , a s a re e s tablish e d by law and are 
con s i s tE?nt with th e principl es of fund a men t d l jus tice" 
tw o r e q u i r eme nt s t h e r e for e for th e l a wf u l 
life u n d er t h is Artic l e : 
taking of 
(a) I t must be in accorda n ce wi th procedures estab li s h ed by 
an d con si st ent wit h th e p r incip l e s o f fund a me n ta l 
justicE·. 
( b ) Th e g cg~o~~ on whi ch l ife is taken mus t 
E·stabl i shed by law and consistent with the princ i ples 
of fundamental justice. 
Lei. us examine what that means for New Zealand abortion ] a.-,. 
5.1 The ECQ~~g~c~l Reguirements 
Firstly as to the current ~rocedure. The Rrocedure for obtaining 
a lawful abortion is set out in the Contraception, St er- i 1 is=:.,?.. t ion 
and Abortion Act 1Q77 This Act. and the two Acts which est-
ab 1 i sh the grounds on which an abortion is 
( . 
, J • e. The 
Crimes Amendment Acts of 1q77 and were passed as the result 
of the findings of the Royal Commission of Enquiry on Contra-
ception, Sterilisatjon and Abortion which tabled its report to 
the Heius.e of Repres.entat i ,..,es in !·larch 1977. 
The questjon arises as to whether these procedures are "con-
sistent .-, i t h p 1- i n c i p 1 e s of f u n d am en t a 1 j us t i c e " . The pr o cedure 
is outlined in s.32 of the Act, which p rovides t hat when a woman 
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a pproaches her m•m doctor wi s hing to have an abortion, 
doctor shall consider the case and if it is considered that 
the 
it 
may be covered b y on e of th e e xemptions contain e d in s.187A of 
t h E· Crimes Ac t , 
7 l 
s urgeo n. 
th e do c tor s h a ll r e fe r the case to an operating 
If th e op e r a t in g s urg e on 1 = sati s fi e d th a t th e case do e s in f ac t 
meet t h e c r i t eria o f one o f th e exemp ti ve cl a u ses , th a t surg e o n 
shall refer t h e case t o tw o certifyi n g c onsu lt ants with a r e q uest 
that t hey determine in a cc or d an ce wit h s.33 of t h e Contrac eption 
St Pr i l i :~ati on and Abortion Act whether or not to authorise the 
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performance of an abort i on . Differing provisions apply 
the woman sown doctor i s also ei t her the operating s u rgeon or a 
c:erti fy·i ng consultant or where the operating surgeon is a l s.o a 
certifying consultant. 
In making their decisions, the certifying consultants have , under 
S:, . 32 < 7) of the Act, the power to consult any person to assist 
t hem in t h eir con s ideration of the case. This is , 
contingent upon the patient ' s consent. Under s . 32(6) of t he Act, 
th e woman's own doctor and the proposed operating surgeon a._- c:, 
enti t _l ed the patient ' s consent) to make s.uch repr-e-
sentation s a s th ey think fit to each certif y in g consultant . 
Where t wo certifying consultants arrive a t opposite conclusions 
1n determining a case, then under s.33(3) and (4) of the Ac t the 
opinion of a third ce1 -ti f ying consultant is c oncl u s i ve . 
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How does th is s:,quar·e with "p r in c ipl es o f fu n d a men t a l just i ce " ? 
vJhE1 t are these " pri n ciples of fundamenta l j u stice" r efer r ed to in 
article The Analysis appended to the Draft Bil l di scusses 
t.h j s phr-ase, cornpcu·i ng it. with the e quivalent phr-ase in 
Canadian Charter. The comment reads: 
Fr·om 
"The CanarJi c,m Char-ter· rec,ds: "E~ver·yone has the 
r i ght . . . not to be deprived (of life) excep t i n 
E•.cc:ordance with the pr-inciples Df fundamE"~ntal justice." 
The1'"E· is uncer·tainty· whether the phr-ase "fundamental 
j u~,.t i c E·" t her· E.' r-ef E·r·· s mer· el y to pr-oced ur-es or- e:-: tends 
to substance - in other words whether- it is simQly a 
synonym for- natural iustice. The quite different 
wordino of the New Zealand Article makes it clear that 
matter-s of substance as well as procedur-e are 
ger-manc: ... " (emphasis addE?d) 
thi ~c commE•rit ... and the wording of Article 14 itself may 
the 
be 
jnferred that the procedural r-equirement is one of "natural 
justi c e ". The question then becomes, what does natural justice 
and does the pr-ocedur-e outlined in the Contraception 
Sterilisation and Abortion Act satisfy these requir-ements 7 
It 1s generally said that natural justice involves not just the 
r-ight to a fair hearing - to proper notice, the chance to call 
and to confront the adverse witnesses and evidence 
but also the right to an unprejudiced decider; the decider- must 
not be bia<::.ed. 
5.1.1 - an unb i a s ed dec i der 
Let us consider the r-ight to an unbiased decider. What does the 
r-ight to an unbiased decider mean in the context of abortion law 7 
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Consi cjer- the nature of the interests involved. The ~..,oman 's in-
terests are in her psychological, emotional and physical health; 
right to some degree of autonomy over her body and right to 
privacy (or non-interference by the state). The unborn child'~, 
is in his or her right to life; 
well-being and support upon life birth. 
physical and emotional 
Once thE· CJrour-1ds of l a~'·Jfu.1 abot-ti on have beE.,·n estc.1b] i shed, 
an unbiased decider to be one who would be fully 
aware of these various interests, and who would apply the law as 
out lil the Crimes Act without fear or f a\.tour, and 
either 
e x treme of the abortion debate itself. 
it is the Abortion Supervisory Committee 
with the function of setting up and 
75 
maintainjng Et. 
list o+ "ciecj_dE·t-s" rn'· certifying consultants. Under s.30(5) of 
the Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion Act, the Committee 
1s to appoint persons. as certifying consultants "whose assessment 
o+ cas.es. com1 ng b E::.f or- E-' them 1•J1 l l not be c o l our e d by v i e (•J s. in 
to abortion generally that are incompatible with the 
tenors. of LtheJ ,~et. 11 
certifying consultants should not hold either of 
these viev-Js.: 
.. ' '~ .E:t ,t thc,.t c1.n abortion shouid not be pE:<rfornied any 
ci 1~cumstances .. 
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( b) that the question of whether an abortion should or 
should not be performed in any case is entirely a 
ma tter for th e woman and her doctor to decide. 
s. 30(6) pr ov ides that every ap pointment t o the list of cer-
tifying consultant s shall b e fo r th e term of one year, ~"\Ii th the 
of r-eappoi ntment vesti ng in the S upervi sory Committee. 
Under s .30(7) of the Act, the Committee ma y at any time, at its 
c-Ji sc n?.t i or,, r-e,/o l,:e thE· appointment of any certifying con-
sul tant . This power would presumably be exercised in practice 
where th e number of abortions authorised by a particular cer-
tifying consultant deviated markedly from th e norm (taking into 
a ccount the number of referrals that certifying consultant had 
This 1s because the Supervisory Committee is totallv 
power to in vestigate or review i nd i vi duc:d sta-
ti. sticaJ be the only satisfactory basis upon 
which the Committee could e s tablish that a consultant was mal i ng 
decisions consistent with one of the two e x treme views outlawed 
b ~/ s . .. 3() (5).. (sLtprct ) 
On the face of it then, the New Zealand structure does satisfy 
thi =, element of the natural justice requirement. l..J e ha. vE· a 
po}itica.lly pub 1 i c authority ( the Supervi sor-y Com-
mittee) who appoint and monitor the decisions of the dE·ciders 
(the certifyjng consultants) who must profess to hold and act in 
accordance with, an attitud e on abort ion generally which fall s at 
neither- e;; trf~me of the abortion debate . 
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In ~~ll v. Livingston a~d 8g~gcgb the Court of Appeal indicated 
that judicial review would be available where a claim of bad 
was entered against a certifying consultant. That claim 
in ter-ms of thE· l1Jal l dee i si on ----- ' to be pursued by the 
Attorney-General. 
Perhaps some argument may be made here that this added burden 
(the need to satisfy the Attorney-General grounds so convincing 
as to warrant his intervention) may be contrary to the rules of 
fundamental justice. 
the contE·nt of natural justice always falls to the 
deter-mi nE:>d 
77 
E:· e,-ci sed. 
in the light of the whole context of the power being 
Given the highly polJtical and emotive 
the abortion debate, the indications which the Court of 
Appeal found in the New Zealand legislation as to the proper rule 
of the court in th~ abortion process in the ~~ll case (see below 
p. 75 ) , it may be argued that the additional safeguard against 
pro-
v i d e s , d o E? ~, n C.) · ., i o ] en c c· t. o n a t. u t- a ] j u s t i c e . 
On thE· other· hand, the courts alwavs have power to strike out 
proceedings at an early stage and if the claim was found ~·ianti ng 
in this ~·J2.y , could be disposed of in the normal e>; er c i se ot 
judicial discretion. 
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rt i s less clear th a t th e current proc e dure in Ne w Zealand would 
sati s f y th e fir s t a s p c,ct of th e n a tur ed jus t icE· r e quiremE·nt: th e 
dght t o a f a ir h e arin g . l>Jhat n eed s b e establi s hed firs t l y, 
1 s ,-Jhether th is "fair h earin g " aspec t o f the natur a l 
justice r equ i re ment ap pli es t o the abor t ion si t ua tion at all , a n d 
if so t o whom i t appl i es, and wha t exac tl y i t mea n s f o r- thos
e 
( g i v8n that if i t s h ou ld b e found to ap pl y to th e unb o rn 
chi l c:l ., he or she is 1n n o p osition to argue for him or h er self 
any,,Ja'/) . 
5.1.2 - a fair hearing, the pregnant woman's point of view 
~rom the point of vJew of the pregnant woman. F'robabiy 
the• p,~ocE·dur-es. do givE· he,~;;:, "fc:::it- hE•aring" . The? fair- heel.ring 
r-i::: qu i r- E·men t (expressed traditionally in the maxim ~~gi ~lt~c~m 
[:!artem) is generally held to require that the party whose in-
terests are the subject of deljberation be given notice of the 
and a fair opportunity to answer- the opposition 
CJE·i..=tr]y the ,,Jomi:•T1 is given r,otice of the Ci:,Se to bE met. The 
case to be met is established in the Crimes Act, 1961 and the 
Contr-eception Sterj]isation and Abortion Act 1977 . She is not 
E·nt it led to abortion unless she satisfif2::: b•JO cer ti fying 
consultants that her circumstances come within one of the exem-
ptinq provisjons set out in the Crimes Act . As the question is 
much one of straight out medical judgment, there is not much so 
mor- e that can be done. There is no "opposition
 case" thE• 
woman to answer - there is only an assessment to be made. 
ThE· step Jn the process is a referral by 
the woman s 
doctor to the certifying consultant: 
the ref en-al happen 
only if the doctor considers the case may be covered by one 
of 
the c-::•>: f.:?ir,p t i ons contained in s.187A of the 
Act. Then 
s .. :;:2 (6) of the Contraception Sterilisation and 
Act) with the woman ' s consent, the woman's own doctor, 
{.:ibort ion 
pl US thE• 
proposc~d ciper-ati ng st..wgE·Dr, may mal::E· such repr-esent2.ti ons as 
think fit to each certifying consultant. 
they 
these represenlatjons could of course be prejudicial to her·· 
cl a irn, though one would normally expect the woman to grant con-
to thE representations only if that person 
indicated 
that he would support her case. The present procedure mal::es 
no 
~-pe;::ific a.11 oi ... Ja.ncE· fcH~- the ~~-Jorria.ri to kr10~ .. J of t_he SLlbstance of an·y
 
pn~judicial c ommc?r1 t =·: it is conceivable therefore that 
a sit-
uat ion arise where she is unaware of the 
prejudicial ev1.-
dence. 
7E~ 
[)agana\/2.Sl \/. Minister of Immioration 
this ~·mul d be a 
breach of natural justice. In that case Mrs Daganayasi unsucces-
sfully applied for a permanent residence permit in New 
Zeal a.nd, 
but She later was convicted of remaining 
in 
Zealand after her temporary entry permit had expired. 
An auto-
matic consequence of conviction was a Court order that 
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deported. 
She appealed to the Minister against deportation under s.20A of 
the Immigration Act 1964, as amended in 1977. Section 20P1 gave 
l"li n i ster~ a discretion to order that an offender not be de-
portc·d if he was satisfied that his or her case presented 
circumstances of a humanitarian natLwe v~h i eh 
deportation unduly harsh or unjust. of 
appec:tl under s.20A ~as that one of her New Zealand-born children 
a rare metabolic disease and must remain in New Zealand to 
receive proper treatment. 
f:1 d c,c: t. 01' .. appointed by the Immigration Division as a 
referee was prejudicial to Mrs Daganayasi s case and conveyed the 
that the doctor 1n charge of the clinic treating the 
boy had been fully consulted and was in general agreement lNi th 
the substance of the report. The Minister declined on the basis 
of this report to order that the mother not be deported. 
On appeal to the Court of Appeal it was held bv Richmond P, Cooke 
and Richardson JJ unanimously, that the Minister's decision 
invalid on the ground of procedural unfaJrness because the report 
and memor-anda of the medical r-eferee, or at least the substance 
of any pr-ejudicial content, should have beer1 disclo::,ed to Mrs. 
Daganayasi or her adviser-s befor-e a decision was made! 
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her a reasonable opportunity of answer-ing them. 
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to a 11 m·i 
So too in the abor tion situation then, any evidence prejudicial 
to he,~ claim, entered for the decider ' s consideration by either 
the woman sown doctor, or the operating surgeon should be made 
available to the pregnant woman. 
The s,":\me can be said for evidence t en dered b y an y other person 
is consulted by the certifying consultants under s.32(7) of 
the {-~et (which gives the certifying consult ants the power to 
consult subject to the woman s consent, to 
assist them 1n their consideration of the case). In fact, 
E'VC•r , the· cons.f::•nt r-equi,~i-:::rnent is. again lil:ely to prevent 
prejudicial material being presented to the consultants anyway. 
Ac tu a lly these requirements would apply whether or not the woman 
8\) 
anv claim under Article 14. The doctrinal development 
natural justice which has been so e x tensive over the last twenty 
since· 8i_ggQ v. ~~!g~iD have not relied upon any explicit 
constjtutional indications, but the concept has been seen as an 
already existing backdrop to statutory interpretation, in 
this ser-1SE? as oc,.~- t of the un~·n-itter1 constitu.t:ion itself. 
In fact it is extremelv doubtful that Article 14 does guarantee 
an y thing to the pregnant woman see~jng an abortion anything. The 
t-eference in Article 14 to grounds and procedures "ceinsistent 
course, s a fE.:,guard for the person who is being "deprived of
 
1 if e". I n the abortion transaction this appears to include the 
unborn child. 
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5.1 . 3 - a quality of life ethic? 
n-,e qualification "appeDrs" is used 1 n tht:> 1 ast parr agraph bE•cause 
it may be ar-gued that the concept of "life" in Article 1-'1 in-
cludE·s. a quality of life ethic or component. If it did, this 
,..ioul d open up the procedures and grounds of the abortion trans-
.:1ct ion to attack, not just by the unborn child but also by the 
woman, and possibly the father of the child also. 
The claim would be an extremely weak one however and with respect 
at least to the procedural requirements under Article 14 would be 
a redundant claim in light of Article 21 (discussed below) 
guarantees the right to natural justjce anyway. 
Thi:\t l·Joul d s.t i 11 l e,:1ve oper, ,:1 c 1 ai rr: by these p.:u-t i es; under (.cirt-
1 C] C• 14 that the groun d s of deprivation of their quality of life 
(es;tc:,.bJ. i shed by s.187A of the Crimes Act) were contrary to the 
princi ples of fundamental justice. 
E\/er, assuming Article 14 had some application to the abortion 
transaction, it i s submitted that the last thing the New Zealand 
courts would want to do is become in vo lved in an exercise exam-
in1ng the wisdom of our abortion law. This is an activit'/ ,·Jh1ct , 
the Courts in Commonwealth countries have consistently refused to 
engagE in. 
nature of the relationship and cor1f l 1 cti ng i r-,tE·rests 
involved h1oul.d make it e ;: tremel y difficult for a court to hold 
LJ9 
that concepts of fundamental justice require
d judicial inter-
fer·encE· on such a matter- . The interests involved do 
not make 
this a logically or theoretically impossible scenario; there 
is 
nothing L°"'bout the political process which guarantees 
that a 
difficult and sensitive area such as this will always be 
legis-
l ated on in a way consistent with concepts of fundame
ntal jus-
tice, but it would be a bold and brave court indeed, con
sidering 
necessarily a very extreme legislative scheme, which substitut
ed 
somE· other set of values for those of the legislature. 
It is unlikely that any claim relating to the grounds of 
1 a~"Jf ul 
abortion would be entertained by New Zealand courts therefor
e. 
5.1.4 - a fair hearing: the unborn child's point of view 
Let us examine the legislative procedures then, from the poi
nt of 
view of the unborn child. What is immediately apparent is th
at 
nowhere in the whole process is any voice heard in defence o
f the 
ThE! "oppo·::;ition" (the p1rE·gnant woman) puts her case, e:-:pl ai ni ng
 
. +-1 ~ is in her interests that the pregnancy should be term-
inated; the decider makes a medical judgment and determin
es 
the circumstances establish that the legal criteria are 
sat j '.5f i E·d. Nowhere are the interests of the other main 
(the unborn child) even directly referred to. 
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Indeed as Woodhouse J . pointed out in~
~!! (see a b ove p.19) 
parliament has deliberately avoided any attempt to spell out what 
are to be regarded as the legal rights in an unborn child. The 
only reference is in the long title to the Contraception 
St.er-
ilisation and Abor-tion Act which describE'd itself as "An Act ... to 
provide for the circumstances and procedures under which abor-
tions may be authorised after having full regard to the rights of 
th e unborn child ." 
It may be immediately seen however, that. the "full regard to the 
rights of the unborn child'' and indeed the actual rights which 
the system is having regard to, boil down to nothing more than a 
s upposed 
fronted 
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man. 
t\Jatural 
presence in the mind of the certifying consultant con-
the immediate impact of a distraught pregnant wo-
Is this sufficient to satisfy natural justice require-
justice means different things in different situations. 
Thus, for E' ;: amp 1 _~., an individual hearing would not normally be 
given to a person who was part of a whole class of people being 
affected by a determination made by some public authority (the 
commentary on Arlicle 21 of the Draft Bill gives the example of a 
change in local body rates). 
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In Lord Reid discussed the application of 
principles of natural justice to duties imposed on Ministers and 
distinguished between an exercise of power on a large scale and 
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one relating sole l y to the treatment of an individual; the latter 
being subject to court control far more readily. 
In that case it was held that the Chief Constable of Br i ghton, 
who held statutory office and by regulation could only be removed 
on grounds of neglect of duty or inability was entitled to not-
i fi c i:1 t i on of the charges laid against him and to the opportunity 
to be heard in his own defence. 
Lord Rei cl indicated that natural justice applied to those who 
hold statutory office from which they can be dismissed only for 
cause; those whose property has been taken away in certain cir-
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cumstances; and those whose reputations are being affected by 
decisions taken by professional or social bodies of which they 
ThE? rang02 of factot-s to be taken into account in detE•rmi ni ng 1•Jher1 
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a hearing need be given include: 
1. The int~cests or range of inter-est.s involved~ if 
the interest involved reputation, property rights 
or statutory office, a fair hearing is indicated. 
? The type of judgment to be made by the decision-
makers; are they considering whether personal 
fault exists (fair hearing indicated) or the best 
method of ensuring efficient govern ment (no 
hearing indicated)? 
·-·. The sanction imposed by the decision. 
4. li.Jha.t other safeguards into the 
1 egi sl a.ti on'"::, 
Applying these criter ia to the abortion decision we see: 
1. The interest involved for the unborn child is his 
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or her right to l i fe; far more funda mental 
mere property rights or reputation. 
than 
? The type of j udgment to be made is one where the 
individual circumstances are all important. The 
effect upon the unborn child is direct : as one of 
the two central parties whose interests are being 
' ,_I• 
balanced, the effect is not in any sense 
incidental. The element of personal fault 
indicated Bi~9€ v. Baldwin is not present, but is 
not a necc::?s~~c,i.r-y factor. (86) 
The sanction imposed by the decision 1s 
penalty for the unborn child. 
a death 
These factors indicate the right to representation of the unborn 
chi ld; the opportunity to answer the pregnant woman's case. 
there are difficulties with this argument; 
in determining how this requirement might operate 
difficulties 
1n practice. 
Does natural justice require a person to rebut the woman s case, 
a kind of a devil s advocate present at the consultation? 
Who would s/he be? A s tatutoril y appointed doctor indicating the 
reasons why in hi s opinion the grounds set out in the Crimes Act 
arE:' not present i (."L -the particular case? Would it have to be a 
What limits to his or 
doctor--::· What would be his or her brief? 
her Would s/he be able to call witnesses? 
Could s/he 
tender documentary evidence in the form of affidavits, say of the 
father of the unborn child? Could s/he interview other related 
par-ties (e.g. the pregnant woman 's spouse, 
the father of the 
unbor-n child, the c;iirl 's parent s:. if a minor etc) in 
order to 
gather evidence? Should this representative pe
rsonally appear 
before the certifying consultants at a ll, or should all evidence 
c:--;,· 
...J ..:, 
s/he tenders be documentary? Who should appoint him 
or her? 
As one considers all the questions that such an appointm
ent 
raises, it becomes patently obvious that a posi
tion such as this 
could and should never be created. It would be 
impractical to 
the point of near (if not actual) impossibility, expe
nsive, and 
would do great violence to the structure of our ab
ortion system. 
In fact the 1977 Royal Commission specificall
y rejected the 
concept. And there are alternatives. 
One such alternative would be to allow those individu
als who have 
a legitimate interest in the outcome of the decision
 (e.g. the 
father, the spouse~ the woman's parents if she were 
an unmarried 
minor) to make such submjssions as they desired to th
e certifying 
consultants as of right. At the moment these p~ople m
ay (under 
s.37A of the Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion
 Act) be 
consulted if the certifying consultant so chooses 
and if the 
patient consents. Under the scheme outlined above, t
hey would 
not require the patient's consent, nor would such rep
resentations 
be at the indulgence of the certifying consultant. 
If there was any relevant evidence that could be add
uced in 
favour of the unborn child, it would be by this sm
all group of 
people - the child's father, the spouse of the pregn
ant woman and 
the parents of an unmarried minor. It is the attitud
e of these 
people close to the woman in question which will be 
largely 
relevant in determining whether she falls within the 
exemptive 
provisions of the Crimes Act. 
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It will be their response to the pregnancy which will 
determine 
in part the degree of risl:: which the preg
nancy poses to her 
mental 
mental 
health. Approximately 75 per cent of all abortions have 
justified on the grounds of serious danger to the woman's 
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health in New Zealand 1n the last four years. If th
ere 
is evidence from these people that the woman will receive a high 
input of emotional, psychological and economic support from these 
people throughout the pregnancy and for as long afterwards as she 
dee i de=:. to keep the baby, natural justice requi
res that it be 
maclc:? available to the person deciding the future of 
the unborn 
child; 
mal::ing. 
it is evidence of central relevance to the decisi
on-
Oral or documentary evidence from these interested par-
ties would do no violence to the current scheme. 
If these people had nothing to say in support 
of the unbrn-n 
child, then that is a relevant factor too, 
for the same reason 
that supportive evidence is relevant; it would go to establishing 
the degree of danger to the woman ' s mental health. --
last factor mentioned in Bi~g~ v. ~~lg~iQ a determini
ng 
a hearing need be given was the procedural sa.feguard
~, 
written into the legislation. It is arguable that 
the safeguards 
of the current system are adequate to satisfy natural justice. 
It might be said that the certifying consultant, 
in keeping the 
interests of thE1 unborn chi 1 d at the "forefr-ont of 
[his] con-
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sideration" when listening to the patient's 
evidence, 
filling the role of the representative fo
r the fetus. 
is ful-
Ther·e is 
some merit in this argument - indeed it is a part o
f the answer 
to the suggestion consi dE.'red above ( at page 55) that some o
ther 
person should be appointed as the unborn child's ad
vocate. But 
the claim is meritorious only if that person really
 has evidence 
in favour of the unborn child to hold in his mind. 
l•Ji thout this 
oppor·tuni ty for input by those interested parti
es mentioned a-
bove, the process looks less like being a fair 
one; it does not 
sound much like a fair hearing, or natural justic
e, to say that 
the 
and 
"decider··" 1s also thE.1 "r·epresE:~ntc:1tive
11 of the unborn 
may not, except with the permission of the pregna
nt 
evi dencE' in favour of the child whose interest 
he 
pointed to safeguard. 
child, 
~·Joman, 
is ap-
In l.Jal l \/. Livingston and Bg~gcgb there are very str·ong in-
dications from the Court that the system should not 
be interfered 
However, what 1s being mooted here is not an interfe
rence 
of the kind the Court rejected in Wall. Jn that 
case the Court 
founci the 1 E.'g i s.l al.:i ve conte:-: t and the statutory p
rocedure to be 
inimical to the co-existence of judicial review. 
The e:-: i sting 
procedure for obtaining a lawful abortion would not
 be inimical 
to the introduction of the changes proposed above ho
wever. Indeed 
they may be seen as enhancing the procedure, by 
giving the de-
cider additional relevant material on which to base 
his decision. 
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Having considered what procedural requirements 
the principles of 
fundamental justice require, let us now turn to that other a
spect 
of lk t i c 1 e 1 4 , the grounds on which the taking of life ma
y be 
justified. 
established 
Article 14 directs that not only must the procedure 
for the deprivation of life, but also the grounds 
themselves must be consistent with the principles of fundam
ental 
justicE'. In the context of the abortion transaction this m
ay be 
re£:1son enough on its own for the courts to hold that A
rticle 14 
djd not apply to the unborn child. 
In Wall the Court refused even to allow judicial review to te
st 
the legality of the decision on the law as it stands at prese
nt; 
this indicates the unlikeliness of the court considering 
legality of the g r o un d s set down by our legislature in the 
the 
light 
of s,.uch nebulous notions c:'\S "principles of funda[Tlent al just
ice". 
The tas,.k ~"'hi eh ~,Joul d confront thE:? courtS:. 1 s an e:: tremel y 
difficult one. It would need to decide firstly, what princ
iples 
of fundamental justice applied to the act of abortion. Second
ly, 
_..., . 
thE'Y would need to establish what these principles req
uired in 
terms of the grounds for lawful abortion. Thirdly the c
ourts 
1·mul cl have to examine the exE:?rnptive provisjons in s.187A of the
 
Crimes Act in light of their answers to these first two ques
tions 
and determine if there is any breach of those requirements. 
That second question is difficult, and would involve the Cou
rt in 
the same sort of exercise already entered into by Parliamen
t in 
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framing the law in the first place. 
So because of both the difficulty of the question, and the danger 
of the Court being seen as usurping the role of Parliam
ent in 
ansvJer i ng it, the Court may be unlikely to find unconstitutional 
anything but the most e:-:treme legislation. Legislation 
proscribing abortion altogether or allowing it on demand spring 
to mind as possibly breaching the principles of fundamental 
justice. 
There may be a further complication with Article 3 - the "Just--
ified limitations" clause, rf2ading: 
"The rights and fn~edoms contained in this Bill of 
Rights may be subject only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democr-atic society." 
This could possibly be used by the Court as an answer to any 
suggestion that Article 14 imposed restrictions upon the grounds 
E'stab 1 i shed in the Crimes Act. 
Article 
..,. 
._.) is a limitation provision on each of the separate _..,. 
freedoms established by the Bill of Rights. It r-·ecognises that 
nonr,::, of the rights stated in and guaranteed by the Bill are 
absolute. 
The first point to note about it is that it comes into play only 
~"lhen one of the guaranteed freedoms has been presumptively 
abr- i dged. So if it were presumptively established that the 
provisions of s.187A of the Crimes Act abridged rights accorded 
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to the unborn under Article 14, those provis
ions might still be 
justified under Article~~ they would not nece
ssarily be doomed. 
The second point about Article 3 is that th
ere must be "limits 
prescribed 
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Soci et' 1 ---·---L 
In Re Ontario Fil_m and Video A22reciation 
the Ontario Court of Appeal held that film ce
nsorship 
legislation which did not supply standards to c
ontrol the censor 
failed because of the vagueness and breadth of 
the discretion of 
the Board, its pov-Jers ~·JerE~ not "pr-esc r·ibed by 
la~·J". 
The New Zealand abortion legislation is not li
kely to fall foul 
of this The procedures and 
grounds for 1 av~ful 
abortion are clearly set out in the New Zea
land Acts, and the 
tas!:: of the medical practitioners involved is n
ot to exercise a 
discretion but to form a medical opinion on wh
ether those ground s 
exist in the circumstances. 
The thir·d important f eature of Article 3 i
s that it puts the 
burden of persuading a court that the prov
ision justifies a 
or other governmerrt action ~·Jhich is presumptiv
ely in breach of a 
right in the Bill on the Government or other p
arty relying on the 
1 ah, or·· action. 
In the context of the present discussion, Go
vernment would need 
to persuad e the court that the limits in the 
Crimes Act on the 
right to life guaranteed under Article 1~ a
re reasonable and can 
be justified in a free and democratic society. 
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rt is difficult to imagine that any 1 a~-.i whi eh br
-eached a 
"principle of 
"dernonstr-ab l y 
fundamental justice" (Article 14-) could ever-
justified in a fr-ee and democratic society". 
be 
( per-
ArticlE' 3). It is difficult to discer-n what, if any,
 differ-ence, 
there is between the two phr-ases. The r-elatio
nship bet~-.ieen 
Articles 3 and 14 is unclear- therefore. 
Another- possible appr-oach under- Ar-ticle 14 is a c
laim that it 
provides the fetus not only with the positive right
 to life, but 
also the conver-se r-ight to pr-otection from life. S
uch a claim 
1•mu l d be analagous to the r-ecent Canadian decision h
olding that 
freedom of r-eligion incor-porates also fr-eedom from 
r-eligion. In 
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B v. ~ig ~ Dr-ug Mar-t Ltd the Supr-eme Cour-t of Canada deter-mined 
the (Feder-al) bgcd~§ Q§y Act which generally pr-ohibits wor-k 
or commercial activity on a Sunday infringed s.2a o
f the Canadian 
Charter- of Rights ~nd Freedoms which reads: 
The 
s.2 ''Everyone has the following fundamental freedo
ms -
(a) fr·eedom of conscience and r-eligion" 
judges on the Supreme Cour-t wer-e unanimous in 
conclusion that the Act infr-inges s.2(a) of the Cha
r-ter- and 
is of no effect. 
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their-
thus 
Five of them held that the purpose of the Act ~"'as "the com
pulsion 
of sabbc:{tical observance" in dir-ect conflict with the Cha
rter 
"prevents the government from compelling individuals to 
per-f or-·m or abstain from performing otherwise harmless
 acts 
because of the religious significance of those acts to oth
ers." 
The other judge agreed with the result but thought it w
as the 
effect rather than the purpose of the Act which was offensi
ve. 
In tor-t theory the wrongful life concept 1s emer-ging as an 
action 
br-ought by a live-born child alleging that due to the n
egligence 
of the defendant, he was born. 
The situation involves severely handicapped children brin
ging 
suits ag,:1i nst a hospital, genetic counsE·l l or, 
negligently 
healthy, 
leads parents to believe their chil~ will 
in their decision not to abort. 
be born 
When the 
child is subsequently born severely handicapped, that child
's own 
life is claimed as the injury resulting from the defendant
's lack 
of duE· can::· in adv,i..si ng his par-ents. It is the birth it
self with 
these defects, rather than the defects per se which is clai
med to 
be the result of the defendant's negligence. This actio
n should 
not bE':' confused ~'\lith the 
11 ~\irongful birth" action 1\ihich is brought 
by the parents of the child themselves. 
The doctrine has been recognised by the California Co
urt 
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Appeal in Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories in w
hich 
plaintiff was born with Tay-Sachs disease. Genetic te
sting 
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of 
the 
to 
determine whether ei the,~ of the parents was a carrier of the 
disease was negligently performed and revealed a negative result. 
The plaintiff claimed that her mother would have chosen to abort 
the pregnancy had the test correctly shown her parents to be 
carriers of the disease. 
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AmE·r-i can casE•s had rejected claims of thjs type on the 
foll m•Ji ng basis: 
1. It was logically impossible to measure the damages because 
this would require a comparison of the child's condition 
q~· 
, ·-' 
with that of present non-existence. 
2. That since birth with defects was better than non-existence, 
the child had suffered no harm. 
qn • "+ 
~. To allow the cause of action would be to approve abor-
95 
tion. 
4. That because society pl a ced a high value on life, to declare 
any life to be a harm, regardless of the degree of deformity 
Q •' ,b 
would be to circumvent that belief. 
5. That it was impossible to draw the line of recovery at which 
6. 
the deformities were not serious enough to warrant recovery 
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of damages. 
That it was i mpos s i b 1 e to l,:nm·J the true desires of 
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defective child. 
the 
The Court in Curlender rejected this reasoning and allowed the 
l'llrongful life action 1n cases where the genetic test is capable 
of disclosing a high probability that a severely impaired child 
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would result and that due to the defe
ndant's negligence, a se-
verely handicapped child does result. The b
ases of the court's 
decision were: 
1. 
~. 
L. 
' ._,. 
Public policy which dictated the need for a wr
ongful life 
action on four grounds: 
(a) Abortion is legal and it is the duty of the 
medical 
profession to provide parents-to-be with accu
rate in-
formation on which they can decide whether to a
bort. 
(b) The need to ease the national health care 
burdens. 
( C) The need to protect the public from the
 medical 
profession's negligence. 
(d) The need to provide a remedy in keeping 
with the fun-
damental jurisprudential notion that for 
every wrong 
there is a remedy and that an injured part
y should be 
compensated for all damage proximately ca
used by the 
Defective birth is itself an injury; the c
ourt rejected the 
argument that no injury had been suffe
red since existence 
with defects-~as better than non-existence. 
" The r ea l i t y . . . i '=· that such a p 1 a i n t i f f both
 e :-: i s t s 
and suffers due to the negligence of others ... W
e need not be 
concerned with the fact that had the defendant 
not been neg-
ligent the plaintiff might not have come into 
existence at 
all."(99) 
The Court rejected the argument that it was 
impossible to 
measure the child's damages because this woul
d involve a 
comparison between his present conditio
n and non-existence. 
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It set out the measure of damages as follows -
11 We construe thE· 11 wrongful 1 if e 
II cause of action ... as the 
right of such child to recover damages for the pain and
 
suffering to be endured during the limited life span avail-
able to such child and any special pecuniary loss resulting
 
f t- o m t h E· i rn pa i red con d i t i on . 
11 
( 1 0 0 ) 
The court went further, declaring that a child has a causE· 
of action against his parents if they decide to proceed with
 
the full term of the pregnancy in the knowledge that the
 
fetu s is defective. It stated as obiter: 
11 If a case aros e where ... pat-ents made a conscious choice to 
proceed with a pregnancy with full knowledge that a ser-
iously impaired infant would be born ... we see no sound
 
public polic y which should protect those parents from being
 
answerable for the pain, suffering and misery which they
 
wrought upon their- offspring. 
11 (101) 
This obiter drew an immediate legislative response in t
he 
form of S.43(6) of the Californian Civil Code which reads: 
"No cau s e of action a,~ises against a parent of a child based
 
upon the claim that the child should not have been con-
cei ve cj, if conceived, should not ha v e been born alive." 
The English Court s have emphatically held that the co
mmon 
does riot recognise the "~·wongful life" 
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claim. In 
the plaintiff child was born disabled as a result 
of 
rubella which had infected her mother in the early months of 
her 
pregnancy. She alleged that the Essex Health Authori
ty's 1 ab-
oratory was negligent in testing the mother's blood samples
 with 
the result that she was misled as to the advis
ability of an 
abortion, and that the doctor wa s negligent in failin
g to advise 
the mother to abort. 
The Court of Appeal considered and rejected Curlender as fa
iling 
to provide any answer to the two central objections to this 
cause 
61.J· 
of action. 
1. 
The court considered these to be: 
That the only duty the defendants owed to the unborn 
child was a duty not to injure her. To say that the 
defendants were negligent in allowing her to be born 
deformed amounted to imposing a duty upon them to 
terminate her life. 
The coLwt held: 
"There is no doubt that this child could legally have 
been deprived of life by the mother undergoing an 
abortion with the doctor's advice and help. So the law 
recognises a difference between the life of a foetus 
and the life of those who have been born. 
a But because a doctor can lawfully by statute do to 
foetus what he cannot lawfully do to a person who 
been born, it does not follow that he is under a 
obligation to a foetus to do it and terminate its 
has 
1 egal 
life, 
or that the foetus has a legal right to die ... 
To impose such a duty towards the child would ... make a 
further inroad on the sanctity of human life which 
would be contrary to public policy. 'It would mean 
regarding the life of a handicapped child as not only 
less valuable than the life of a normal child, but so 
much less valuable that it was not worth pre-
set-ving ... " ( 103) 
2. The damages would be not only difficult, but impossible 
to 2.ssess_.,_, The defendants would be liable for compen-
sating the child for the difference DE:'tween its con-
dition as a result of their al 1 oi,.Ji ng it to be born 
alive and injured and its condition if its embryonic 
life had been ended before its life in the world had 
begun. A judge could not possibly value that. 
The Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 
deprives the child of a right to this action and im-
ports the assumption that, but for the occurrence 
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giving rise to a disabled birth, the child would have 
been born normal and health (not that it would not have 
been born at al). 
Several difficulties arise in determining the effect of these two 
lines of authority in the New Zealand context. 
Firstly, the problem of which line New Zealand courts would 
fol ov-J arises. Presumably they would folow the English case; 
New Zealand Courts regard English decisions as persuasive auth-
or it y. American cases are far less persuasive authority. Fur-
~~ ~~ was decided after ~~cl~QQ§C and professed to be 
based upon reasons which Curlender could not displace. 
The greater difficulty is the question of how the tort position 
would be translated into constitutional law. Even assuming the 
doctrine did exist in its most e xtreme form in New Zealand, what 
l"JOUl d that tel us about the fundamental human rights and 
doms in the Bil of Rights? 
How would such c3. "right" tr-anslate in legislative terms? Would 
it demand the striking down as unconstitutional of abortion 
v-Jhich did not provide for-"fetal dE?for-mity" as an indication for 
1 awf u 1 abortion? 
ZealErnd legislation 
Such an indication already exists in the New 
1 ()Lj. 
but to suggest that the tort doctrine 
would require its inclusion in any constitutionaly valid statute 
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is difficult. 
Ser-i ous questions arise both as to the nature of t his supposed 
"r-ight" and t h e identity of the party in whom i t rests. 
If indeed it 1s a right, there should normaly be a choice in-
volved as to its exercise. Clearly the unborn child is incapable 
of either making or communicating such a choice. F'erhaps there-
fore, someone should be appointed to make it for the unborn 
childr:· But according to what criteria? The Ne~'\/ Zeal and leg-
islation p,·-ovides for abortion in cases where "there is a sub-
stantial risk that the child, if born, would be so physically or 
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mentaly abnormal a5 to be seriously handj.capped. " 
But for whom does this create a right? What is the nature of 
that ri gl-,t? It may be seen that this subsection creates no right 
exercisable by the unborn child. As the choice involved in this 
" r i g h t " may be e >: er c i s e d ( on 1 y ) by the m o t  h e ,-, without reference 
to any criteria other than her own desires, it may be considered 
to create no right for the child at al. Rather, it appears to 
have created a right in the mother not to give birth to "defec-
tive" life. 
Indeed it is this later right which the Curlender decision 
appears to create. None of the factors mentioned in that case 
the ~~ ~~ objections which stem from an appraisal  o f the 
child' s viewpoint, but they do square very nicely with a mother-
oriented appr-oach recognizing her right to not have t o raise a 
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"defective" child. 
It is submitted that the right of a child to protection from life 
impossible to draft as it is to conceptualize and 
should 
is as 
not be read as being implicit in the language of Article 14. 
It \',JOUl d appear from the discussion i
n the last chapter 
that 
Article 14 has no effect on abortion law in New Zealand. 
This is 
a variety of reasons including difficulties in 
overcoming 
Canadian and New Zealand case-law, 
syntactic barriers in the 
provision 
itself and the difficulty of establishing what Article 
require in terms of change to the existing 
structure 
an71 vJC\'/. 
OnE:.~ other 
article in the Bill may have a potential effect 
ever, insofar as it effects those people directly affected by the 
abort ion decisions; Article 21. 
Article 21 
provides the cons.titutional "Right to Justice" 
contains two provisions relevant to this discussion: 
1. Every person has the right to the observance of 
the principles of natural justice by any tribunal 
or other public authority which has the power to 
mal,:e a determination in respect of that person's 
rights, obligations, or interests protected or 
recognised by law. 
Every person 1•Jhose rights, 
obligations or 
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and 
interests protected or recognised by law h ave b een 
affected by a determination of any tri b una l o r 
other public authority has the right to apply to 
the High Court, in accordance with 1 av-J, for 
j u dicial review of that determination . 
Let us examine these provisions from the viewpoint of the three 
figures most involved 1n the abortion transaction : the prEignant 
woman; the father of the unborn child; and the unborn child . 
Q~l : Article 21 Jll 
6.1.1. The QDsition of the Qregnant woma n 
The pregnant ~-Joman is clE1arly a "perscm" for the purposes of this 
The cet-tifying consultants, being appointed by a 
statutory body and acting according to a statutory procedure, are 
clearly a "public authority". In authorising the abortion, they 
"the to make a determination in of [her] 
nised by· ld~'.J " (tt-,e Contrdception Ster .. ilisaticm and Abortjon Ac
t 
and the Crimes Act). 
woman clearly falls within the parameters of this 
provision then, and so is entitled to "natural justice " in 
the 
decision-making procedure. What this may require from th~ 
wo-
man's viewpoint in the abortion context is considered in f
ull 
abo·-.re (pages,. 4 5 - ~() ) in the discussion on P.1rticle 14, so there 
is no benefit in reiterating that here. Suffice it to concl
ude 
that this constitutional guarantee would probably requi
re no 
change to the present system to accommodate rights vested in the 
vJoman. 
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~~ ~ ~ The ~osition of tb~ f~tb~C gf the unborn child 
It is unclear whether the father is encapsulated by Article 21 
( 1 ) . The provision applies onl y if t h e certifying consultants 
ar·e making a dotermination in respect of the father's rights, 
obligations, or interests protected or recognised by law. 
The meaning of the phrase "in respect of" is unclear. 
of that expression might require that the cert-
ifying consultants be making a specific deter-rni nation of t h e 
father's rights for his inclusion. Arguably, they are not.  He 
is not the focus of their atention. They are concerned with the 
11-Jho 1s before them and whose rights, obligations and 
interests are protected or recognised by the Contraception Ster--
ilisation and (~bortion (kt and thf! Crimf.?s Act . They are con-
ce1-n1:-?d also ,•Jj_th the ur,born child ,·Jhose rights are "in thE· fore-106 
front of [ t  h E:> i r J c 1 i  n i c ,:d c or, s i d E.'t-at i. on " . But it is not clear 
that either of the Acts with which they are concerned (the Con-
and Abortion Act or the Crimes 
direct] y "p,~Dtect or recognise" any rj_ghts of the father. Cer-
tainly they do not do so explicitly. 
So it may be argued that this prov1s1on should be read very 
na1'To, . 1 y, excluding the father whose rights are not the specific 
subject of the consultants· investigation or decision. 
HoitJever, even if the provision were interpreted the 
fath~r may stil be included. For his interests (in the effect 
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on his relationship with the mother, in the fu t u re 
o f h is c h i ld 
etc) are recognised implicitly in the proscription on 
abortion 
except in the circumstances set out in those two Act
s . Even o n 
this narr·ow vie~·J of thE.· me2ming of Ar-ticlE' 21 (1) th
er-efor-e, the 
fa t her may be entitled to natural justice. 
FLwthermor-e the ·f athET has cl ei::'\r obligations, 
right=; and 
interests under other Acts (such as the Guardianship
 Act 1968 and 
the Family Proceedings Act 1980) which are continge
nt upon the 
certifying consultants' df.::>c i si or:. For- e;-: c:~mp 1 e
 the duty t o 
maintain the child of the Family 
Proceed i ngs Act 
clear l y depends upon the determination of the consul
tants . 
his guardianship rights arising under s.6 
of the 
Gu.::.:wdi ansi,i p Act are affected by the abortion
 de~ision. So 
+1-. 
~· ll s broader sense, thE' consulta
nts i:u-e making "a deter mi nation 
in respect of [the father's] rights, 
obligations or-
prot!-::>cted or recognised by lavJ" 
_..,. 
interpretation of this provision may well entit
le the 
father to natural justice therefore. 
This would have an important effect on 
the New Zealand decision-
ma I:: i n g process . At present the New Zeala
nd scheme provides the 
father of the child with no right o
f access to the d ecision-
maker-s; he is not entitled as o
f right to make any 
representations to the consultants. Pro
vision is made in s.32(7) 
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of the Contraception Sterilisation and Abo
rtion Act for 
consultat ion of any person by the certifying consu
ltants, but 
that i s contingent upon both the patients and t
heir own consent. 
From the point of view of the father, it is only 
by way of 
privilege that he may make representatives. 
I t may 
anticipated thi:\t he is unlil::ely to be granted this
 pr-ivilege 
he intends to oppose the abortion; the patient
 is unlikely 
grant consent to the consultation. 
be 
if 
to 
If the father were entitled to natural justice 
however, he might 
successfully claim the right to consultation. 
Let us examine Article 3 to determine whether 
it could be called 
in aid to limit this right. Article 3 provide
s inter alia that 
thP "justifjecl limitations" must be prescribed 
by law . 
The comment on this phrase within the Draft Bil
l indicates that: 
"The l a1,J t·mul d not ha VE:' to be an Act of F·ar 1 i am
ent; it 
could be subordinate legislation o r common law"
 (107) 
___,. 
preventing the father making representations to
 the consultants. 
Such a claim has never been the subject of
 litigation. Ho~,,iever 
there may be limit on his right to natural just
ice pres ent in the 
Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion A
c t which outlines the 
necessary procedure for a lawful abortion. 
provides th a t aconsultant may: 
"1•Ji th the consent of the patient, 
othe1~ person ... as he thinks fit" 
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s. 32(7) of the Act 
con~::,ul t with any 
The necessary implication of this provision is th
at the father 
may make no representations e x cept with the patien
t's consent and 
the consultant's discretion (inclusio 
unius est e .~t C } U :...=: i 0 
altarius.) 
It may bEc> assumed that the e
:-: pres<:::.i on 
II prE:>c:,cr i bed by 1 a~'-J II in 
!::".irticle includes all necessar
y implications cif that e:
-:press 
1 3\l·J. 
There 
to 
natural justice under Article 21(1) therefore. 
ThE'. of 
hr· tic 1 e 7 ·-· is that the 1 i mi t 
be 
"r-ea.scin,:11::JlE]" and 11 dernonstr-~,bly justified in a fr-ee
 and democratic 
s,ociety 11 • There are several 
might tencl to 
E•s.tabl i::'.h that the consen
t requirement in s. 32 (7) 
is. neither 
11 rcascinable" nor- "demcir-1s:,trably justified in a freE:> 
and democr-atic 
soc:iE::>ty": 
1. 
7 ._, .. 
I! • 
The f athE'r- , as 
the pregnancy, 
the deci ~si or·1. 
the person equally responsible for 
has a strong personal interest in 
The consent requirement may be anticipated 
opera t e in practice as a complet e limitation 
a father who had evidence prejudicial to 
~.,ioman 's. case. 
to 
upon 
the 
The right to consultation would not necessarily
 
breach any of the woman's rights. It would not
 
act as a v e t o on her abortion decision. 
A consultation may 
information which 
decision. 
provide the consultant 
would ajd him in making 
with 
his 
All these factors tend, it
 is submi tb:?d, to establish that 
the 
limitations s. 32(7) is 
neither- reasonable, nor 
demonstr-abl y justifiable in a free and
 democratic society . It 
should be noted that i r, any 
action questioning the 
constitutional validity of s . 32 < 7) , 
the onus would be upon the 
(3over-nment to establish that t.hE• 
1 j mi t was reasonable and 
demonstrably justified. 
ThE::> position of the unborn ch
ild is likely to remain unchanged 
under- this provision as he will 
have difficulty establishing 
locus s.tandj. It appea
rs from the case law (discussed a
bove) 
that a new legislative indi
cation is required before the Courts 
will recognise the personhood of the unborn ch
ild. As the Bill 
of Rights gives no such indicatio
n, it may be assumed that 
thP 
u n b or .. n c h j J. d i s n o t i r1 c 1 u d E:' d i n t. h r0 p h 1- as e 
II E v Pr y person 
11 
• 
It is 
discussed above (pages So - 5 6 ) what the natural 
justice require-
ment may mean in relatjon to the unborn, should
 it be established 
that it applies to them. 
6.2 Arti c le 2 1 J ~l 
The pregnant woman would clearly have standing
 under Article 21 
and in l ight of that provision
 might ~..,el 1 question the 
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jurisdictional 1 i mi t S l._,h i C h the Court
 imposed upon 
108 
In that case Dr Wall applied for ju
dicial review of 
itself in 
a decision 
made by certifying consultants to a
uthorise an abortion for a 
tec~nage <;Ji r-1. The Cour-t of Appeal up
held the High Cour-t decision 
o·f Speight J .. and refused to grant revi
ew. ~·Joodhouse F'. de-
1 i ver-ed the judgment of the Court 
and found two issues ar-ising : 
the question of availability and lik
ely limits of jur-i sdi cti on, 
and the matter of locus standi. 
i s. important in the context of the p
r-esent discussion 
that he expressly declined to giv
e a definitive r-uling in 
j 1..w i sd i c t i on issue, holding 
desirable to express a final view up
on at least 
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necessary 
the first 
is 
or 
of 
thos-,e 
This is important 
for- it leaves the way open
 for the court to alter- it!':,
 
position 
. r 
1 T that is what Article 21 is pr
oven to demand. 
_.., . 
l.>Joodhouse F'. did make some gen
eral comments about the role of 
judicial review in the abortion
's decision-making process. Hi
s 
first point was that nowhere in
 the Contraception Ster-il1sa
tion 
and Abortion Act except in the
 long title is there a mention 
of 
t r1 E· p h r a SE' "the un b o~·-r1 chi l c1 " • 
Nor, he pointed out, is there any 
mention elsewher-e of its rights. 
He notE·d the r-ights 
of the unbor-n ar-e pr-otected 
-,i= 
'..J 
by sur--
rounding lawful t ermination of a pr
egnancy with the "pr ecau tion-
ary process" of pr i or authorisatio
n of two cert i fying consul-
t.ants . He emphasised s.30(2) of t
he Act, which stipulates that. 
shal 1 be "the minimum numbE·r of ce
rti f ying c onsu l tan t s 
required to ensure, so far as possi
ble, that every woman seeking 
an abortion has her case conside
red e:-:pedi ti ousl y " (emphasis 
added by Woodhouse P.). Of importance 
also, was: 
"~1Jhat must have been a deli be
rate Parliamentary 
decision : the avoidance of any a
ttempt to spe l l out 
what were to be regarded as the l
egal rights in an 
unborn child; with the consequen
tial absence of any 
statutory means by which rights (wh
atever their nature) 
could bE· er1forcf.=d.
11 (emphasis i:.'l.dd(::d) (110) 
All t h ec:,e factors went to dem
onstrate that the legislative and 
administrative context indicated t
hat no judicial review of de-
cisions would normally be availabl
e. Other factors within the 
ContracE·pti on Sterilisation a
nd Abortion Act also led to this 
conclusion. Fi r s t 1 y , the " d
e l i b er-ate a b s e 11 c e of an y r e v i e ~·J p r o
 -
cess i nsi dE· thE· Act i tse] f" 
wh i eh t,.Joodhouse P found to be base
d 
upon three considerations, namely: 
(i) The special attention given 
in the Act to the 
preservation of anonymity of the wo
man patient. 
(ii) The whole process which is 
designed to place 
"fairly and squarely upon the medic
al professions 
as represented ... by the certifying
 consultants a 
responsibility to make decisions wh
ich will depend 
so very much upon a me dical assess
ment pure and 
simple." 
(jii)ThE· "adverse medical implic~1
.tiDns" which could 
arise from the passage of time if 
such a review 
1·JerE· under-taken. 
Tho second factor was the absence 
of any direction in the Act or 
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Regulations requiring any reason to be gi
ven by the certifying 
consultants for an authorisation other th
an reference to one of 
the statutory exceptions within s.187A of
 the Crimes Act. This 
is presumably significant because of the p
ractical problems which 
would arise if a review were undertaken wh
en the reasons for the 
decision were not known. 
lrJood h ou SE:' F' . also made some comments on 
the related quest.ion of 
l.ocu ~; s.t.andi .. He affirmed firstly the rulin
g of Speight Jin the 
High Court that no direct claim of standing
 could be spelt out of 
th e mere existence of the fetus. He bas
ed this finding upon the 
Contraception Sterilisation and Abortion A
ct itself and also upon 
He 
authrn~ity 
1 1 1 
of Fat.or, v. British Pregnancv Advisory 
11 2 
Ser-\/i ce ----·--·-
discounted Dr Wall s independent claim to stan
ding, noting 
"It ,•Jou l cl 
purpos-E' of 
into ~such a 
be inconsistent. with the whole scheme an
d 
the Act if it were possible to introduce
 
matter anybody other than the woman hersel
f 
and those very few persons who have bee
n given the 
statutory responsibilities for screenin
g her request 
for an abortion " (113) (emphas.is added) 
It ,·Jc\S only the "statutory pat-ticipar1t.s" th
en ,-<Jho would ever hav e 
standing. 
P:11 these facte>rs, plus the f
act that any review would be con-
sidering a medical judgment made by profes
sional men acting under 
a statutory dut y where it would 
be difficult to isolate that 
str-ai cJht-out mf.·?dical judgrnent 
1 egal questions, 
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indicated a restriction of j u risdiction to claims of 
bad faith 
instituted by the Attorney-General. 
It might be argued hm'-Jever that Ar·ticle :~1 (2) provides t
he 
right to review on wider issues than those restrict
ed 
established i n ~~LL, such as: 
1 . Whether the persons who determined the matter 
were 
properly invested with authority under the Act; 
r::· Whet h er those persons did address 
the matters committed to them, by 
only relevant factors into account. 
necessitate the keeping of records). 
t.hemsE.,l ves to 
taking all and 
(This might 
3 .. lJ.J h et t-, et-· t h £-? ·y h a\/ e er- r e d i n 1 a ~·J , f o t- e ~< a rn p l e ., b ~
.-1· 
not basing the decision upon one of the exemptive 
clauses under s.187AC1) (3) of the Crimes Act, or 
alternatively, by basing the decision solely upon 
the factrn,·s mentioned under s.187A(2) (i.e. age of 
the woman or evidence of rape) which are not in 
themselves grounds for abortion. 
4. Whether on the basis of the material before them
, 
no reasonable certifying consultant could have 
reached the decision which they reached . 
Thc:::-=:.e are the types of question the Court migh
t no,m,::1.l l y ask 
it~,elf i r1 r·E·vi ev-,ii. r·1g admi ni stra.tj ve dE · ci s, i ons a
nd Art i cl E· '.21 ( 2) 
might arguably overturn Wall to the e x tent that it 
refused review 
on these grounds. 
diffjculties stand in the way of e s tablishing the 
right to 
this wider jurisdiction however. Fi1'·s
tly the phrase "in accord-
ancE· 1 ... ith lai•J" appearing in Ar·ticle 21 ('.2). 
This phrase recog-
nise=:. (according to the commentary to t
his provision) that 
law may regulate review proceedings. 
"The phr·ase is i 11tended, hovJever·, to penni t only 
the 
ulation of the right and not to autho,jse its deni
al. 
cordingly any attempt completely to deprive the Hi
gh 
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the 
reg-
Ac-
Court 
o f its revie~"' , pm,.,,ers would violate the guarantee . " ( 11 4) 
The ~~ll decision then, in merely limiting the grounds o f review 
and not depriving the Cou rt of its review powers altogether wou l d 
not necessarily breach this provision. 
The sE•cond difficulty which arises is that Article 3 may be 
invoked to override any implications as to wider review powers in 
Article ? (?\ and justify the ~~ll limitations . The question 
~,Joul d arise, whethe1~ such limitations are " r easonab l e" and 
"do.monst r-ably justifiable in a free and democratic society". 
From the woman's point of view it is likely that t his 
quE·sti on 
purely academic and so the question is considered 
below from the point of view of the father. 
The first question for the father 1s whether he prima facie falls 
w i t h i n the 11-m r d i n g of A,~ t i c 1 e 2 l ( 2 ) • The provision applies to: --
"Evet-y person l--'JhosE• r- i ght s, ob 1 i gat i ems or interests 
protected by law have been affected by a determination 
of -::my tribunal or- other public authority." 
The 11-mr-ds "affected b y " appear- to ha.ve a v-Ji der meaning than thE· 
"in respect o·f" found in Ar-ticle 21 (1). It may be seen that the 
ric;::ihts, obligations and interests of the father under the Guar-
dianship, Family Proceedings and other Acts which regulate 
the 
pater-nal relationship ar-e clE:,ar-Jy "affected by" the consu l t.2mts· 
decision (see dis.cussi.on above, p. 11 ) . Prima facie therefore the 
father- is entitled to judicial review of that decision . 
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This raises serious questions about the Wall decision. The first 
is whether Wall is good law insofar as it completely precludes a 
action by the father of the unborn child. It ~-Jas noted 
above (p.75) that apart from the pregnant woman herself, "only 
those very few persons who have been given the statutory respon-
sibilities be 
permitted standing. 
This clearly does not include the father of the unborn. the ne:: t 
question is whether Article 3 may justify the ~~ll limitation. 
To do s.o, the exclusion of the father from the (small) group of 
peop 1 E· entit.lE?d to review under Wall needs to be a reasonable 
1 i mi t, v-Jhi eh ''dE·monstrably justifiable a free 
and 
dc~moct-ati c society". 
It 1s submitted that that language does not accurately describe 
the total exclusion of the father from review proceedings. The 
reasons for this-ire those same reasons set out above (p.73 ) in 
the di scussi or1 of the father's right to natural 
j u~5t ice under 
{kticle 21 (1). 
It 1s noted that the commentary 1n the Draft 
Bill of Rights 
indicates that ''The Courts may be expected to apply the ordinary 
115 
r- u 1 e s as t o s t and i n g t D seek j u d i c i a 1 rev i e vJ " . It is submit-· 
ted that it should not be understood from this that 
is 
unchallengeable even in the light of the qualjfying language in 
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Article 3. To so hold would be to render Article 3 nugatory. It 
must still be established that the ~~ll limitation ( ~'-Jh i C h e'-'-
eludes the father from review altogether) jc "reasonable" and 
"demonstr·ably justifiable 1n a fr-E·e and democr·atic society". 
Like the pregnant woman, the father of the unborn child would be 
concE·rnE·d about the limits un the grounds of review which the 
Court imposed upon itself in ~~ll- The difference is that he is 
likely to seek review in different circumstances from the woman, 
i . E•. the request for an abortion has been g,~crn ted. The 
d1 scus~;i on at pages 1a - 71 on this question is relevant 
cll~~o. 
Thf.? unborn eh i 1 cl would be faced with the same problems with 
standing under this provision as under Articles 14 and -- 21 ( 1 ) . 
It is clear from case law that the unborn child will never- be 
granted standing in the abortion transaction (see discussion 
abuvE~ page~:; 1- 4 ,';;\r)cl The correctness of the Cou
rts' 
reasoning in those cases is also discussed above. 
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!.11~ CONCLUSION 
It may be anticipated that if the proposed Bill of Rights for New 
Zealand has any effect upon the New Zealand abortion scheme, 
it 
will be through the provisions of Article 21. 
The centrc:d "beneficiary" would bE~ the father of the unborn child 
who may play a greater role 1n the decision-making process. This 
the 
rol E· might take the form of a right to consultation 
~-.Ji th 
c e ,,- t i f y i n t;J c o ri s u 1 t .::, n t. s m i::\I ,: i n g t h E"7 abort i on d e c i s i on . This mc:\y be 
seen as an appropriate modification of 
current procedure 
v~h i eh totally excludes the father from 
the decision-making 
proc:£~Sc:-, e;.: CE'pt. the pregnant woman 
the certifying 
consultants' consent. 
The possibility of a right to judicial review of the consultants ' 
decision ls. intf.::.>re s. ting, particularly in light 
of the \:4~LL 
decision which effectively precluded it. In practice however it 
may not b E' c~ ~,. f r i ~1 h ~E' n i n g a po s s i b i l :i. t y as i t ma. y at f i r-s t a pp e aT 
to =c.ome. It may be expected to be exercised only seldom as 
it 
would probably apply only to the pregnant woman and the father of 
the unborn child. 
The posit i ori of the pregnant woman under the Bill of Rights 
is 
unlikc:=ly to change, as even under the terms of the ~~11 decision 
she has the right to judicial review. The scope of that 
review 
may be widened by Article 21 (2) however. The prese
nt procedure 
already adequately protects her right to natural justice . 
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The position of the unborn child is likewise likely to remain 
unchanged. The distinctions arising in recent case-law between 
the property and tort cases on the one hand, and the abortion 
situation on the other, is likely to remain as regards the legal 
recognition of personhood. Criticism is levied in the paper-
the supposed differences between these situations. The 
comment of the Saskatchewan Court of Queens Bench in Borolt-Jsk i 
that 
" •.. r-apid 
de5:.i ri..:.i.bl E' 
advances in medical sciences may make it soundly 
that some legal status be extended to foetuses, 
irr-espE'ctiVE! of ultimate viability ... " 
1s, it is submitted, an accurate and well-chosen comment. The 
proc(2dural changes; mooted in this paper- provide 
someth i rHJ akjn to natural justice for the unborn child in the 
decision-making procedure stem from this same concern. 
Lastly it is considered that the difficulties raised by the 
ectogE·neti c techniques 1n deter-mining the actual "rights" 
involved l n t h E• a b 01~ t i On <3. C t ( i . e • of termination or feticide) 
are likely to remain more apparent. than real in New Zealand. 
The resources 
artificic:~l 
are unlikely 
(in terms of high-technology equipment 
and so on) required to provide a real 
such as 
choice, 
to e v er be available in great enough numbers to 
create a real ethical difficulty (surrogacy notwithstanding). 
if the resources were available, the question of 
responsibility for the preserved life and the cost involved would 
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likely sway the decision in favour of feticide and not the mere 
termination of pregnancy. 
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